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Bramnick: Federal Statutes - Preemption - National Labor Relations Act and
1983-84]
FEDERAL STATUTES--PREEMPTION---NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT AND EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
PREEMPT STATE-IMPOSED ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION OFFICIALS
REPRESENTING CASINO
EMPLOYEES

Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local 54 v.
Danziger (3d Cir. 1983)
In 1978, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local 54 (Union) filed its annual registration statement as required by New Jersey's Casino Control Act (Act).' Thereafter, the Division
of Gaming Enforcement (Division) 2 reported to the Casino Control Commission (Commission) 3 that certain of the union's officers were disqualified
under the licensee qualification provisions of the Act and requested that the
Commission prevent the Union from collecting dues and administering the
4
pension and welfare funds.
1. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, Local
54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 819 (3d Cir.) (order granting preliminary injunction),
reh'g denied, Nos. 82-5210, 82-5234, 82-5260 (June 30, 1983),prob.Jurl . noted, 104 S.
Ct. 479 (1983). The Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1-5:12-152 (West
Supp. 1983) authorizes the licensing for casino gambling of those hotels in Atlantic
City which meet specific qualifications. 709 F.2d at 817. Under § 93 of the Act, all
labor unions which seek to represent casino employees must be licensed and registered with the Casino Control Commission. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93 (West Supp.
1983). For a discussion of the Casino Control Act, see notes 88-92 and accompanying
text infra. For the text of the Act's registration requirements, see note 90 infra. The
Union has approximately 12,000 members of whom over 8000 are employed as waiters, waitresses, bartenders, cooks, kitchen help, housekeepers, and other hotel service
employees in the Atlantic City hotels and casinos. 709 F.2d at 817. The Union has
been duly certified by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) pursuant to § 9 of
the NLRA "as the representative of those employees for purposes of collective bargaining. . . [and] participates on behalf of its members in the Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders International Union Pension Fund, and its Health and
Welfare Fund." 709 F.2d at 817. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
2. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-55 (West Supp. 1983). The Division is responsible
for investigation and enforcement of the Act. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-76-5:12-79
(West Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the Division's authority, see note 89 and accompanying text infra.
3. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-50 (West Supp. 1983). The Commission has
broad regulatory authority over casino gambling. Id. §§ 5:12-63-5:12-75 (West Supp.
1983). For a discussion of the Commission's responsibilities, see notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
4. 709 F.2d at 819. The suspect officers included Frank Gerace, President; Robert Lumino, Secretary-Treasurer; and Frank Materio, Grievance Manager. Id. For a
discussion of the Act's licensee qualification provisions, see notes 91-92 and accompanying text infia.
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Before the Commission could hold disqualification hearings,5 the Union
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
alleging that the qualification provisions of the Act were preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 6 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).7 An amended complaint further alleged that
the questioned sections were also preempted by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). 8
The district court denied the Union's motions for a preliminary injunction 9 and an injunction pending appeal. 10 The Commission then went for5. 709 F.2d at 819. For a discussion of the Commission's duties regarding license applications, see note 89 and accompanying text infra. Before filing suit in the
district court, the Union, at a preliminary conference raised objections to the constitutionality of the qualification provisions. 709 F.2d at 819. The Commission ruled
that since it was not a court, it lacked competence to consider the objections. Id.The
Commission then set September 9, 1981 as the date for an evidentiary hearing on
disqualification. Id The Union filed its complaint in district court on August 17,
1981. Id
6. Id See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the
NLRA, see notes 20-22 & 25-29 and accompanying text znfra.
7. 709 F.2d at 819. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act regulates employee health, welfare and
pension plans which are "established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both.
...
Id § 1002(1). For a discussion of ERISA, see
notes 23 & 30-31 and accompanying text infra.
8. 709 F.2d at 819. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976). For a discussion of the
LMRDA, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra. The complaint also alleged
that the career criminal provision of the Act was both overbroad and vague in violation of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. 709 F.2d at
819. The Union requested a declaratory judgment pronouncing the qualification
provisions invalid and also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against
the enforcement of the relevant sections. Id.The Union claimed that the qualification provisions conflicted with federal labor relations statutes and that "[t]he possibility that Local 54 will be prevented from collecting dues and administering pension,
health and welfare funds .. .create[s] a direct impediment to effectuation of the
rights of self-organization guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act .... ." Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Local 54 v. Danzinger
[sic], 536 F. Supp. 317, 326 (D.N.J. 1982) (order denying preliminary injunction),
rev'd and remanded, 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.), prob. urnr.

noted, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983).

9. 536 F. Supp. at 326-38. In denying the motion for preliminary injunction,
the court held that the Union "was not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim
that the Casino Control Act is preempted by the LMRDA." Id at 328. The district
court reasoned that since the LMRDA expressly specified when state law is to be
excluded from contemporaneous application, and since these provisions were not applicable to the Union's claims, the LMRDA did not preempt the New Jersey Casino
Control Act. Id.at 327-28 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)). In addition, the district court held that since the enforcement of the qualification provision
was within the discretion of the Commission, there was no conflict with the NLRA or
ERISA. 536 F. Supp. at 326-3 1. The court assumed that the Commission would use
its discretion to avoid a conflict with federal law. Id at 331. For the text of the
provisions of the Act which grant the Commission discretionary enforcement power,
see note 88 ihfra.
10. 709 F.2d at 820; 536 F. Supp. at 342-44. After the denial of the preliminary
injunction, the Union applied for an injunction pending appeal. 709 F.2d at 820. See
FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). The application was initially denied by the district court and
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ward with the disqualification hearing, concluding that several Union
officials were disqualified and that the Union should be barred from collecting membership dues and administering the health and welfare funds."
The district court subsequently enjoined the Commission, pending appeal,
from taking any steps to enforce its decision. 12 On appeal from the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction,1 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit1 4 reversed, holding, inler a/ia 15 that the disqualifiby the Third Circuit. 709 F.2d at 820. As a result, the Commission proceeded with
its hearings. Id The Union moved for reconsideration by the district court regarding
an injunction pending its appeal. Id See FEri. R. Civ. P. 62(c). The district court
then granted the Union's motion enjoining enforcement of the Commission's order,
which was to expire on the entry of a judgment disposing of the Union's appeal. 709
F.2d at 821.
11. 709 F.2d at 820-21. The Commission disqualified President Frank Gerace,
Executive Board member Frank Materio, and Business Agent Karlos LaSane under
§ 86 of the Act. Id Gerace and Materio were disqualified under § 86() due to their
association with members of organized crime. Id at 820. LaSane was disqualified
under § 26(c) because of a 1973 extortion conviction. Id at 821. For a discussion of
the Act's disqualification criteria, see notes 90-92 and accompanying text zbfra.
12. 709 F.2d at 821. For a discussion of the relevant enforcement procedures,
see notes 88-92 infra. The district court enjoined the Commission from taking any
steps to enforce § 92 or its disqualification decision. 709 F.2d at 821. The district
court's order did not prohibit the Commission from issuing an opinion regarding the
disqualification provisions with respect to the Union's administration of the health
and welfare funds. Id The Commission issued its opinion holding that the dues
collection prohibition and the welfare fund prohibition could be applied singly or
jointly. Id In this case, the Commission stated that it would invoke only the dues
collection prohibition. Id (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the § 93 provisions
prohibiting the collection of dues and the administration of welfare funds, see notes
91-92 and accompanying text infra.
13. Id at 831. On appeal, the Union did not argue that the LMRDA preempted the Act, but only that the NLRA and ERISA preempted the Act's disqualification provisions. Id. at 843 n.10 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
14. The case was heard before Circuit Judges Gibbons, Higgenbotham, and
Becker. Judge Gibbons wrote the court's opinion. Judge Becker filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
15. 709 F.2d at 821-33. In addition to its holding that section 7 of the NLRA
and ERISA preempt the New Jersey Casino Control Act, the Third Circuit dismissed, for lack ofjurisdiction, the cross-appeals of the Commission and the Division.
Id. These appellants had argued that under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) " 'an appeal
from an injunctive order supports review of an order denying a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action, for improper venue, for lack of jurisdiction, and for
lack of standing.'" Id at 821 (citing 9 J. MOORE & B. WARD, MOORE'S FEDERAl.
PRACTICE
110.25, at 271 (1983)). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
since the Division and the Commission were the prevailing parties in the district
court, they were not aggrieved by the denial of the preliminary injunction. Id.
Moreover, the court argued that no order had been issued on these motions since the
district court had only discussed them in its opinion and that "appeals do not ordinarily lie from opinions." Id. at 821 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 54(a), 58). Finally, the
court stated that even if the opinion were treated as an order, the rule in the Third
Circuit was that "it would not be reviewable in conjunction with an appeal from
even the grant of a preliminary injunction." Id. (citing Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz,
670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982)).
Further, the court held that the district court had erred in failing to grant the
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cation provisions of the New Jersey Casino Control Act are preempted by
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act and by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.),probjurs. noted, 104
S. Ct. 479 (1983).
Both the NLRA 16 and ERISA 17 confer on employees certain rights and
protections' 8 in areas of industrial relations having a significant impact on
interstate commerce.' 9 The NLRA consists of three separately-enacted statutes and amendments thereto which constitute the primary body of federal
law controlling labor-management relations in private industry. 20 The
Union's request for preliminary injunctive relief against the pending Commission
proceeding, but affirmed the district court's decision not to abstain from hearing the
case. d. at 831-33. For a discussion of these holdings, see notes 125-30 and accompanying text infra.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the
NLRA, see notes 20-22 & 25-29 and accompanying text infra.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of ERISA,
see notes 23 & 30-31 and accompanying text znfra.
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1001 (1976). Employee interests protected by the
NLRA include "full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." Id § 151. The
principal interests protected by ERISA are those of employees and their beneficiaries
in the receipt of funds from employee benefit plans previously endangered by the
"inadequacy of current . . . standards." Id § 1001(a).
19. See id. §§ 151, 1001. Congress, in enacting the NLRA, sought to eliminate
obstructions to the free flow of commerce: "Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest .... ." Id.
§ 151. Similarly, Congress enacted ERISA in recognition of the effect that employee
benefit plans have on interstate commerce:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial . . . ; that they
are affected with a national public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful de-

velopment of industrial relations; that they have become an important
factor

in

commerce

because

of the

interstate

character

of their

activities . ..
Id § 1001(a).
20. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1 (1976). The three major Acts
include the original NLRA of 1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 337, §§ 116, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935); the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, §§ 1-503, 61 Stat. 136-62 (1947); and the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L.
No. 86-257, §§ 1-707, 73 Stat. 519-46 (1959). See 29 U.S.C. 14-97 & 401-531 (1976).
Section 7 of the Wagner Act protects employee organizational rights. 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 8 of that act declares as unfair labor practices
certain employer acts, such as the following: restraint, interference or coercion of
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights; domination of unions; discrimination in terms of employment so as to discourage union membership; and refusal to
bargain in good faith with the majority employee representative. Id § 158. For a
discussion of section 7, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text 1tfra. Section 9 of the
Wagner Act created a three-member National Labor Relations Board authorized to
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rights of employees protected by section 7 of the NLRA form the heart of
adjudicate unfair labor practice charges and, if necessary, order an appropriate remedy enforceable in the courts of appeals. See 29 U.S.C. § 195 (1976). See also R.
GORMAN, supra, at 5.
The Wagner Act also empowered the Board to hold secret elections for the purpose of employee selection of a collective bargaining representative. See R. GORMAN,
supra, at 5.
The Taft-Hartley Act separated the Board's prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions between the General Counsel, who was charged with prosecuting unfair
labor practice claims, and the Board (increased to five members), which ruled on the
merits of the case. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 139 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 153 (1976)). In addition, section 7 was amended to accord employees the
right to refrain from joining a union or engaging in other concerted labor activities.
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
Section 8 was amended to enumerate several types of union unfair labor practices
such as interfering with employee section 7 rights, causing an employer to discriminate against non-union employees and refusing to bargain in good faith. Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)).
The Landrum-Griffin Act is addressed "primarily to the problems of corruption
within union leadership . . . and of undemocratic conduct of internal union affairs,
which was to be cured by a 'bill of rights' for union members in such matters as union
meetings and elections, eligibility for office, and union disciplinary procedures." See
R. GORMAN, supra, at 6. See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 51946 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)). For a further discussion of
the LMRDA, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text tnfra.
The NLRA was enacted under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767, 772 (1947). The commerce clause, article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, provides in pertinent part as follows: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The immediate incentive for enacting the NLRA was to
speed the economic recovery of the 1930's. See D. BOK, A Cox & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 73 (9th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as BOK].
Prior to the enactment of the NLRA, the Supreme Court narrowly construed
Congress' power under the commerce clause, invalidating several attempts by the
legislature to regulate the employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (wage and hour limitations promulgated
under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934 held invalid as not within the
commerce power because the regulated practices had only an "indirect effect" on
interstate commerce); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a
federal statute making it unlawful to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because of union membership, since regulation of labor relations was beyond the scope of Congress' commerce power and was therefore unconstitutional).
See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that Congress lacked
power to regulate labor standards in the bituminous coal production industry); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding invalid a law
which established a compulsory retirement and pension plan for all carriers subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act). For a general discussion of the Court's early New
Deal commerce clause interpretation, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142
(10th ed. 1980).
However, in 1937, the Court adopted a more expansive interpretation of Congress' commerce clause power, and sustained a number of regulatory statutes. See id.
at 150. For a discussion of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing Plan"
of 1937 and its impact on the subsequent shift in Supreme Court commerce clause
decisions, see id. at 150-61. Among these newly approved regulatory statutes was the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) which granted employees significant rights and protected labor union activity. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
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federal labor law. 2 1 Under section 7, employees are guaranteed the freedom
to form or join labor unions, to engage in concerted activity, and to bargain
22
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
ERISA safeguards employee health, welfare and pension plan benefits
through a comprehensive system of regulations establishing minimum standards of vesting, funding, and fiduciary designed to "remedy certain defects
in the retirement system which limit the effectiveness of the system in provid' ' 23
ing retirement income security.
Corp., 310 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughhn, the NLRB had issued a cease and
desist order against an employer for violation of the Wagner Act's prohibition on
union-based discrimination, but the court of appeals had refused to enforce the
Board's order. Id. at 22. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRA and
the Board's orders promulgated thereunder were valid and enforceable. Id. at 29 n.9.
The Court explained that the rights granted employees by section 7 of the Wagner
Act were an essential condition of industrial peace:
Instead of being beyond the pale, we think that it presents in a most striking
way the close and intimate relation which a manufacturing industry may
have to interstate commerce and we have no doubt that Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard the right of respondent's employees to
self-organization and freedom in the choice of representatives for collective
bargaining.
Id at 42-43.
21. See BOK supra note 20, at 69-77. Section 7 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part as follows: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Prior to the enactment of§ 7, laws regulating labor
relations evinced an anti-union animus. See R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 1-5. In the
early nineteenth century, organizational activity for the purpose of improving wages
and working conditions was met with criminal prosecution. Id. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, labor activity was controlled through the use of
civil injunctions. "Concerted activities in support of such unionization-strikes, picketing and boycotts (of the employer or its product)-were treated as conspiracies
which restrained trade and which inflicted irreparable damage upon the affected
employer." Id at 1. The federal courts also played an active role in enjoining concerted labor activity "in part through the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction . . . and
in part through the jurisdiction accorded by federal antitrust laws." Id at 2-3. Congress, however, forced a shift in the judiciary's approach to labor-management disputes when it passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Pub. L. No. 65, ch. 90, § 1,
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)). The NorrisLaGuardia Act "declared it to be the public policy of the United States that employees be permitted to organize and bargain collectively free of employer coercion and
sought to achieve that goal by regulating and in most cases barring altogether the
issuance of injunctions in a 'labor dispute.' " R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 4. Congress subsequently solidified its control over labor-management relations with the
enactment of the NLRA in 1935 where it announced a more "affirmative policy"
towards protecting employee rights. Id. at 5-6. For a discussion of the NLRA and
subsequent federal acts, see notes 16-31 and accompanying text supra.
23. H. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4639, 4643. The report explained as follows:
The growth and development of the private pension system in the past two
decades has been substantial. Yet, regulation of the private system's scope
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Both ERISA and the NLRA regulate fiduciary qualifications.2 4 Within
the NLRA, these provisions are contained in the LMRDA 25 which was enand operation has been minimal and its effectiveness a matter of debate.
The assets of private plans, estimated to be in excess of $150 billion, constitutes the only large private accumulation of funds which have escaped the
imprimatur of effective federal regulation.
Id. at 3, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4641.
Prior to ERISA, federal pension regulation essentially consisted of three statutes
"accomplishing different purposes and vested within different federal departments
for enforcement." Id.at 5, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Al). NEWS at 4641. In 1958,
Congress adopted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act).
Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq.
(1976)). The Act's requirements were to be administered through the Secretary of
Labor. Id at 4, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4642. The Disclosure Act
was designed to protect the interests of plan beneficiaries by requiring the plan administrators to file and disclose various financial reports and send, upon written request, an annual copy of the plan report to the beneficiaries and the Secretary. Id.at
4, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4642. The 1962 amendments to the Disclosure Act made theft, embezzlement, bribery, and kickbacks federal crimes if they
occurred in connection with employee pension and welfare plans. d The amendments conferred investigatory and rulemaking responsibility upon the Secretary and
imposed the requirement that plan officials be bonded. Id. In addition to the Disclosure Act, § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) regulated pension
and welfare plans, specifically those administered jointly by the employer and labor
unions. 29 U.S.C. § 302 (1976). Absent from these regulations were guidelines regarding funding adequacy, vesting benefits, and security of investment of fiduciary
conduct. Id.at 4, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4642-43. Finally, the
Internal Revenue Code established guidelines for employer tax deductions and for
contributions made to employee benefit plans. Id.
ERISA was enacted to provide uniform pension regulation, which Congress
deemed necessary because of the enormous growth of pension systems and the inadequate protection of employee rights under existing federal law: "In almost every
instance, participants lose their benefits not because of some violation of federal law,
but rather because of the manner in which the plan is executed with respect to its
contractual requirements of vesting or funding." Id at 5, 1974 U.S. COIE CONG. &
AD.NEWS at 4643.
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 504, 1111 (1976).
25. Id §§ 401-531. Title V of the LMRDA outlines the fiduciary responsibilities and requisite qualifications of union leaders. See id.§§ 501-504. Section 501 provides that union officials occupy a position of trust in relation to the organization and
its members, and further that these officials are subject to criminal penalties for misuse of union funds. See id.§ 501(a). For a further discussion of§ 501, see note 28 and
accompanying text thfra. Section 502 requires the bonding of every "officer, agent,
shop steward, or other representative or employee of any labor organization . . .to
provide protection against loss by reason of acts of fraud or dishonesty on his part
directly or through connivance with others" if the union has property or financial
receipts in excess of $5,000. 29 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976). If the representative is not
bonded, then he is prohibited from exercising control over those funds and subject to
criminal sanctions of fines and/or imprisonment. Id § 502(b). Section 503 prohibits
a labor organization from both making loans to its officers in excess of $2,000 or
paying either directly or indirectly the fine for any official convicted of willful violations of Title V. Id.§ 503(a), (b). Section 504 prohibits certain persons from holding
union office if they have been a member of the Communist Party or convicted of a
felony "during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party, or for five years after such conviction or after the end of such imprison-
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acted in part to stem the tide of criminal infiltration into labor unions.26
The reporting and disclosure provisions of the LMRDA require every labor
organization to file a statement with the Secretary of Labor setting forth
certain information relating to finances and internal activities. 27 LMRDA
ment." Id § 504(a). For a further discussion of§ 504, see note 29 and accompanying
text tnfra.
26. See S. REU. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE
CONG. & A. NEws 2318-2421. The Senate report states that "[t]hese and other
provisions of the bill . . . represent a major attack on the abuses and problems identified by recent investigations . .

.

. The bill is designed to prevent, discourage and

make unprofitable improper conduct on the part of union officials and employers
and their representatives." Id. at 4-5, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 2321.
The Report of the McClellan Committee provided the impetus for the enactment of the LMRDA. See Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 248 (D. Minn.), afd,
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). See generally Interim Report of the Select Comm. on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Fields, S. REI'. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee Interim Report]. The McClellan Committee

undertook an investigation of five unions to determine the need for labor reform
legislation. See Nelson, 212 F. Supp. at 263. The findings reported by the Committee
revealed that officials of the investigated unions often ignored the democratic rights
of union members. See id. at 263-69. In its investigation of the Teamsters Union, the
Committee stated as follows:
Teamster officials have crushed democracy within the union's ranks. They
have rigged elections, hoodwinked and abused their own membership, and
lied to them about the conduct of their affairs. They have advanced the
cause of union dictatorship and have perverted or ignored their own constitution and bylaws.
Id at 266 (quoting Select Committee Interim Report, supra, at 443-50). In addition to
official disregard of employee rights, the Committee reports revealed a significant
amount of official corruption. See generally Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials
Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REv. 437 (1967). This commentator
noted, "One of the Committee's overall findings was that union funds in excess of 10
million dollars were either stolen, embezelled or misused over a period of fifteen years
by officials of the five unions investigated." Id at 437 (citing Select Committee Interim
Report, supra, at 1).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1976). Title II of the LMRDA imposes reporting and

disclosure requirements on both labor unions and employers. Id Professor Bok has
noted, "Certain of these provisions, requiring the filing of various sorts of information, are founded on the premise that public opinion and democratic processes within

the union can curb much abuse if information concerning union activities is systematically collected and made available." BOK, supra note 21, at 1186. Section 201(a)
requires the union to send to the Secretary of Labor information setting forth such
items as the name and address of the organization, the names of officers, initiation
fees and dues, financial audits, and procedures regarding membership qualifications.
29 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1967). Section 201(b) requires the union to file information concerning its assets and liabilities and loans received by an officer or extended by the
organization to any business enterprise. Id. § 201 (b). Section 201(c) requires that the
information sent to the Secretary under § 201(a), (b) be made available for examination by union members. Id § 201(c). In addition, a union official is required by
§ 202(a) to report to the Secretary of Labor all income received by himself, his
spouse, and his minor child, from employers with whom his union deals, either commercially or as a bargaining representative. Id. § 202(a). Section 203 requires employers to report all loans to any official, agent, or other representative of a labor
union and also to disclose any funds expended in a manner designed to influence
employees in the exercise of their rights to organize and bargain collectively. Id.
§ 203. Section 209 imposes criminal sanctions for anyone who wilfully violates Title
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section 501 declares that union officials "occupy positions of trust" in relation to the organization, and mandates that they hold, manage, and invest
union funds "solely for the benefit of the organization" in accordance with
its constitution and bylaws.2 8 In addition, section 504 of the LMRDA prohibits persons convicted of specific designated offenses from holding union
29
office.
Similarly, ERISA prohibits a convicted felon from serving as a plan
II or knowingly falsifies information. Id. § 209. Other provisions of the LMRDA
include Title IV which regulates the internal election procedures of labor organizations and Title I creating a "Bill of Rights" for union members. Id § 101-105 & 401404. Section 101(a) provides that all union members shall have equal rights to vote
and attend meetings, freedom of speech and assembly, the right to vote on dues increases, the right to institute court actions whether or not the labor organization is
named as a defendant, and the right to due process before union disciplinary proceedings are initiated. Id § 101(a)(1)-(5). Section 102 allows union members to sue
if their Title I rights have been infringed, while section 104 allows union members to
obtain copies of collective bargaining agreements. Id. §§ 102 & 104.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). Union officials are prohibited from dealing with
the organization as or in behalf of an adverse party and from "holding or acquiring
any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of [the] organization." Id. Section 501(c) imposes criminal sanctions for any individual who "unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts" union funds for his own use. Id. § 501(c).
Congress deemed § 501 necessary because it felt that "no responsible trade union
officials should have a personal financial interest which conflicts with the full performance of his fiduciary duties as a workers' representative." See S. REP. No. 187,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprtted t 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2330-31
(quoting the ethical practice codes of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations). For the text of the AFL-CIO ethical codes, see
generally 80 MONTHLY LAB. REV. at 352. The senate report stated, "[A]fter the
McClellan committee hearings no one can dispute the simple fact that although the
vast majority of union officials are honest and conscientious men, a small number
have ignored this basic standard of conduct." See id. at 14, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2331. Thus, the report justifies inclusion of fiduciary standards into the
LMRDA by explaining,
The financial conduct of labor unions and their officers is a proper concern
of the Federal Government. This is so because the funds which pass
through union treasuries and for which unions and their officers are responsible are very large, and the uses to which these funds are put have a substantial impact on the nation's economy. Furthermore, if unions are to
enjoy the protection of rights such as are guaranteed to them by the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act, they ought also to
be held responsible for abuses that have accompanied the exercise of these
rights by some union leaders.
Id. at 8, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS at 2324.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1976). Section 504(a) prohibits any person who has been
a member of the Community Party within the past five years or who has been convicted of a crime such as robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny,
murder, rape, and assault from holding union office for five years after his conviction
or after the end of his imprisonment. Id. The Supreme Court has, however, declared
that the Communist Party provisions set forth in § 504(a) are unconstitutional as a
bill of attainder. U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3. The Court explained that Congress does have the power to prevent persons from
becoming union officials if they are likely to cause political strikes, but that the decisions as to who those persons are must be left to the courts. Brown, 381 U.S. at 44950. Application of the prior conviction provision of § 504(a) has been held not to
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fiduciary or administrator "during or for five years after such conviction or
after the end of such imprisonment, whichever is the later." 30 In addition,
ERISA details the responsibilities of plan fiduciaries and provides for en31
forcement through an action for damages or removal.
By virtue of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
federal statutes such as the NLRA and ERISA may be interpreted to preempt concurrent state legislation, 32 The "clear-cut" preemption cases are
said to be those in which a state law is in actual conflict with federal law, or
where Congress, acting pursuant to a plenary power, specifically prohibits
parallel state legislation. 33 Outside the "clear-cut" areas, courts have had to
apply an ad hoc balancing analysis in ruling on preemption questions. 34 In
such cases, the goal is to determine whether, under the circumstances of the
violate the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder or ex-post facto laws.
Postma v. Local 294, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 337 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1964).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1976).
31. See id § 1109(a). Section 1109(a) provides as follows:
a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from such breach, and to restore to such plan
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of
the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section
1111 of this title.
Id. The responsibilities imposed on plan fiduciaries include the obligation to discharge their duties with the care, skill and prudence of an ordinary reasonable person
"solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries" for the purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable administrative expenses. Id. § 1104(a). The
duties of fiduciaries generally include participating in the drafting of a written instrument for the implementation of a funding policy in accordance with ERISA standards, the naming of a plan trustee to manage and control the assets of the plan, and,
at the fiduciary's option, appointing an investment manager or managers to manage
the assets of a plan. Id. §§ 1102-1103.
32. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (the Federal Alien
Registration Act preempts a state law requiring aliens over 17 to register and satisfy
other requirements). For a discussion of Hines, see note 35 and accompanying text
btfra. The supremacy clause provides as follows:
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of preemption analysis under both the

NLRA and ERISA, see notes 45-86 and accompanying text itfra.
33. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL.

LAW

292 (2d ed.

1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. If federal law and state law are in such conflict

that both cannot stand, federal law clearly overrides the conflicting state law. Id.
Similarly, if Congress expressly states its intent to preempt an entire field, or, conversely, expressly authorizes concurrent state legislation, preemption analysis is simplified. Id
34. Id. at 293. Preemption principles are designed to "avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority over the
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particular case, state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
3 5
The Supreme
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.
subject matter. Where there are no indicia of congressional intent, the [c]ourt may
have to balance the state and federal interests, to achieve this end." Id.
However, when a federal court is faced with a challenge to a state law on preemption grounds, it often avoids the preemption question by invoking the doctrine of
abstention. One of the chief purposes of the abstention doctrine is to insure against
an erroneous interpretation of the state statute in question by allowing a state court
to determine the parameters of the state statutory or administrative scheme. See, e.g.,
Drucker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1972) (affirming district court decision to
abstain from deciding whether city rent control act was applicable to Federal Housing Administration project where state courts had not ruled on the issue of whether
the ordinance was authorized by the state enabling act).
The Supreme Court first developed the principle of abstention in Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co. See 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention appropriate in a suit for violation
of the federal constitution when it was unclear whether a state railroad commission's
order violated a state anti-discrimination law). In Pullman abstention cases, the district court retains jurisdiction over the action while the parties submit an unclear
question of state law to the state courts. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 374 U.S. 411 (1964) (a party has the right to return to the district
court for a final determination of his claim after obtaining the authoritative state
court construction for which the court abstained). See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS 304 (4th ed. 1981). Pullman abstention is usually invoked to avoid deciding
a constitutional issue unless it is necessary to do so. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. See
also NOWAK, supra note 33, at 100-01.
A second abstention principle, known as Burford abstention, requires federal
courts to avoid interfering with comprehensive state administrative schemes. See
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 314 U.S. 315 (1943) (affirming district court decision to abstain from hearing an appeal from a state commission's order denying oil drilling
leases when the state legislature had established a system of thorough judicial review
by its own state courts). See generally Note, Abstention and Certiftation in Diversity Suits:
"Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964).
The third form of abstention bars a federal court from enjoining pending state
proceedings based on principles of comity. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(reversing judgment of district court enjoining state prosecution because of national
policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances). See also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975) (applying Younger to civil nuisance litigation where the state's interest in the
proceeding was as strong as it would have been if it were a criminal action).
35. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnote omitted). Hines was
one of the Court's earliest attempts to formulate analytical standards for preemption
decisions. NOWAK, supra note 33, at 293-94. In Hines, the Court held that a 1939
Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens over 17 to register and satisfy other requirements was preempted by the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940. Hhes, 312 U.S.
at 68. The Federal Alien Registration Act was passed in 1940 after a three-judge
district court had enjoined enforcement of the state statute as an "encroachment" on
federal legislative authority. Id at 60. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court considered only the claim that the 1940 Federal Act precluded the enforcement of the state
law. Id at 62. The Hies Court concluded that the need for uniformity justified
preemption explaining that "[w]hether or not registration of aliens is of such a nature
that the Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable
d. at 73. The Court further stated that when Congress added the 1940 Act
.
to its uniform naturalization and immigration laws, "it plainly manifested a purpose
to do so . . . through one uniform registration system . . . . Under these circumstances the Pennsylvania Act cannot be enforced." Id. at 74.
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Court has indicated that state law is to be treated as superseded only when
36
Congress clearly manifests an intent to do so.
The Supreme Court has found that federal legislation preempted not
only state laws regulating areas of traditionally federal concern, but also
state laws governing local interests when the state regulation conflicts with
the federal scheme. 37 In the former category, the Court has held that federal
39
38
legislation preempted state sedition acts, state alien registration statutes,
and state common law actions affecting the control of federally regulated
railroads. 40 The Court has also invalidated state laws relating to local interests such as the identification and sale of tobacco, 4 1 the revocation of drivers'
36. NOWAK, supra note 33, at 292-93 (citations omitted). In early preemption
cases, the Supreme Court presumed the validity of concurrent state laws, yet frequently found the presumption had been overcome. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In Rice, the Court explained its preemption analysis
as follows:
[Congressional] purpose [to preempt state law] may be evidence in several
ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the object sought
to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose or the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.
Id at 230 (citations omitted). In Rice, the Court concluded that the pervasiveness of
the United States Warehouse Act, evidenced by its extensive licensing provisions and
regulation of rates and storage facilities, justified the inference that the Federal Act
superseded the state Public Utilities and Grain Warehouse Acts. Id at 236. In more
recent cases, the Court has indicated a reluctance to infer or second guess congressional intent. See NOWAK, supra note 33, at 295. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973). At issue in Goldstein was whether federal copyright laws preempted a
California statute which made it a crime to "pirate" recordings made by others. Id
at 567-72. The Court refused to infer an intent by Congress to preempt the copyright
field because such an intent was not clearly manifest in the federal laws. Id at 26771. For a discussion of recent trends in the Court's preemption analysis, see generally
G. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 343-57; NOWAK, supra note 33, at 292-96; Hirsch,
Toward a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 529-32 (1972).
37. For a discussion of federal preemption of state laws regulating local interests,
see generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 347-52; Note, Pre-emption as Preferential
Ground- A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). The latter commentator explains that the Court has adopted a balancing approach in preemption
cases similar to that used by the Court in determining whether a state law is invalid
as an unjustifiable burden on interstate commerce. Note, supra, at 219-21. Thus, the
Court will rule against preemption when it is satisfied that valid local interests outweigh the restrictive effect on interstate commerce. Id
38. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (federal anti-communist legislation preempts state law).
39. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). For a discussion of Hines, see note
35 and accompanying text supra.
40. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick and Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311
(1981) (I.C.C.'s exclusive authority to rule on carrier's decision to abandon lines preempted a state action for damages by a local merchant disadvantaged by the
decision).
41. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (the 1935 Federal Tobacco
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licenses, 4 2 home mortgage loans, 43 and local noise control ordinances. 44
Supreme Court decisions regarding preemption of state law by the
NLRA generally fall into one of two categories. 45 The first group is comprised of cases holding state laws preempted because they interfered or conflicted with employee substantive rights under federal labor law. 46 Within
Inspection Act supersedes provisions of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act
which regulated the inspection and sale of certain types of tobacco). But cf Florida
Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (federal statute identifying the maturity date of avocados does not preempt state law establishing different
standards for the designation of maturity date).
42. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (the Federal Bankruptcy Act
provision that bankruptcy effectively discharges all but certain designated judgments
preempted Arizona statute which provided that state may revoke a bankrupt's
driver's license for failure to satisfy a judgment arising out of operation of a motor

vehicle). But cf Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (state law prohibiting
trucks from carrying any vehicle "above the cab of the carrier vehicle" not preempted by less restrictive I.C.C. safety regulations for interstate truckers promulgated
under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (state
law requiring safety inspections of tugboats not preempted by Federal Motor Boat
Act of 1910). Professor Nowak notes that greater deference has been afforded to
health and safety regulations, a traditionally local concern. NOWAK, supra note 33, at
294. This deference may explain the result in Maurer and Kelly. See id
43. See Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulation permitting federally
chartered savings and loan associations to exercise due-on-sale clause of mortgage
barred application of contrary state doctrine).
44. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)
(FAA scheme for regulation of aircraft noise and sonic boom superseded local ordinance limiting hours of aircraft departures).
45. See Lodge 76 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v, Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). The Lodge 76 of Machlinsts
Court observed as follows:
Cases that have held state authority to be preempted by federal [labor] law
tend to fall into one of two categories: (1) those that reflect the concern that
'one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum would
find legal' and (2) those that reflect the concern 'that the [application of
state law by] state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the Federal Acts'. '[I]n referring to decisions holding state laws pre-empted
by the NLRA, care must be taken to distinguish pre-emption based on federal protection of the conduct in question . . . from that based predomi-

nantly on the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.'
Id at 138 (quoting Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 (1958) and
Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 n.19 (1969)).
For a discussion of labor law preemption analysis under these two theories, see generally BOK, supra note 21, at 917-18; R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 766-86; Cox, Labor
Law Preemption Revisited, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Cox, Federahm in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Cox, Recent Developments in Federal
Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jursdction over Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6, 269 (1959);
Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 641
(1961); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally In Conflict With the National
Labor Relations Act, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 132 (1968).

46. See R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 767. Preemption in this category is based
on a "potential conflict between the substantive provisions of federal law and those of
state law." Id The concern is that a "state might outlaw concerted activity which
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the substantive rights category, the Court has preempted state statutes regulating employee strikes, work stoppages, or other coercive activity,4 7 state
anti-trust laws as applied to union collective bargaining agreements, 48 unemployment compensation laws denying benefits to workers who filed unfair
labor practice charges, 49 and state right to work laws providing remedies for
50
discharges sanctioned by the NLRA.
The second category of NLRA preemption decisions involves jurisdictional considerations grounded on the proposition that the NLRB is the
agency vested by Congress with exclusive authority to decide what conduct
is protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 5 1 Within this group, the Supreme
the federal government seeks to protect and will thus frustrate the federal policy
favoring employee organization or free collective bargaining." Id
47. U.A.W. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). The O'Brien Court held that the
NLRA preempted Michigan's "strike vote" legislation which prohibited the calling
of a strike until specific statutory procedures beyond those contained in the NLRA
were satisfied. Id.at 457-59. The Court ruled that the additional procedures infringed on the worker's right to strike and that Congress, through the provisions in
the NLRA, "occupied the field and closed it to state regulation." Id at 457. The
Court has also rejected state law restrictions on the right to strike where the asserted
justification is a threat to the health and welfare of the state's citizens. See Division
1287 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v.
Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963). Motor Coach Employees involved a Missouri law authorizing the Governor to seize a public utility and enforce its continued operation
whenever a strike was threatened. Id at 75-76. The Court concluded that such a
restriction of the employees' § 7 right to strike was in direct contravention of federal
labor law, and could not stand under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Id.
at 82. The Court stated that "Missouri, through the fiction of 'seizure' by the state,
has made a peaceful strike against a public utility unlawful, in direct conflict with
federal legislation which guarantees the right to strike against a public utility, as
against any employer engaged in interstate commerce." Id (footnote omitted). See
also Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry Motor Coach Employees of Am., Div. 998
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 391-97 (1951) (state law forbidding strikes by public utility employees preempted by the NLRA). For a discussion of Supreme Court cases permitting state interference with strikes or picketing,
see note 57 and accompanying text infra.
48. See Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). In
Oliver, a state antitrust law was applied to invalidate a collective bargaining agreement between drivers and carriers regulating the terms of motor vehicle leases. Id at
284-89. The Oliver Court held that the provision was intended to achieve wage fixing, not price fixing, and since wages were a mandatory collective bargaining topic
under federal law, the NLRA preempted this state interference. Id.at 293-97.
49. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n., 389 U.S. 235 (1967). The Nash Court invalidated a state law denying unemployment compensation to any worker who filed
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. Id at 235-39. The Supreme Court
held that an employee's right to file unfair labor practice charges was essential to the
implementation of the nation's labor policies, and that any attempt to thwart the
exercise of this right was therefore preempted. Id at 238-40.
50. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974). The Beasley Court held that § 14(a) of the NLRA which provided that no employer may be
compelled to classify supervisors as employees for purposes of collective bargaining,
justified the discharge of supervisors for union membership and preempted this application of the state right to work law under which the managers sought relief. Id at
662.
51. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
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52
Court has developed a broad preemption rule and has blocked state at53
tempts to enjoin otherwise lawful strikes and picketing, regulate the selec-

(1969). TheJacksonville Terminal Court explained that when referring to NLRA preemption cases, "care must be taken to distinguish preemption based on federal protection of the conduct in question . . . from that based predominantly on the
primary jurisdiction" of the NLRB. Id at 383 n.19 (citations omitted). Commentators have explained that this latter category of preemption cases is analogous to a
"primary jurisdiction" theory of administrative law in which courts defer to the jurisdiction of the NLRB to decide what conduct is protected or prohibited. This practice has been invoked since Congress has "created an administrative agency-expert,
experienced, [and] peculiarly sensitive to federal values in the areas of labor-management relations." BOK, supra note 21, at 916-20. For a discussion of the two types of
NLRA preemption cases, see generally R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 766-86.
52. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In
Garmon, the Court explained as follows: "[Wlhen an activity is arguably subject to § 7
or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted." Id at 245. Garmon involved a dispute arising
from a union's effort to obtain a union shop provision in its agreement with the
employer. Id at 237. The employer refused, and when the union began picketing at
his place of business, the employer sued in state court. Id The court issued an injunction and ordered payment of damages. Id at 238. At the time the state action
was initiated, the employer began representation proceedings before the NLRB. Id.
at 238. The Board declined jurisdiction "presumably because the amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet the Board's monetary standards in taking jurisdiction." Id at 238. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the state supreme
court. Id The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the
NLRA preempted this application of state tort law. Id at 246. The Court explained
that when it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activity regulated by the state
is protected by § 7 or is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (i.e. prohibited activity)
the state jurisdiction must yield. Id at 244. Even when it is not clear whether federal
law provides an avenue for challenging alleged violations of labor law, it is "essential
to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance
to the National Labor Relations Board." Id. at 244-45.
The Garmon Court recognized exceptions to this rule, noting that states could
regulate in areas "where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of
the Labor Management

Relations Act, .

.

. [o]r where the regulated conduct

touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had
deprived the states of the power to act." Id at 243-44 (citations and footnote omitted). For a further discussion of the deeply-rooted local interest exception, see notes
59-60 and accompanying text infra.
53. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (NLRB's exclusive authority to
decide whether picketing is an unfair labor practice preempts state labor board's
jurisdiction to decide similar charges under state law); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) (NLRB decision that strike did not constitute an unfair
labor practice preempted state court injunction prohibiting the conduct as an unlawful restraint of trade, because the NLRB is vested with exclusive authority to determine the legality of work stoppages); Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 776, 346
U.S. 485 (1953) (state law utilized to enjoin work stoppage preempted as an intrusion
on NLRB's jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor practices). But see Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (upholding a state court's authority to enjoin picketing in a particular place on trespass
theory). The Sears Court felt that since the issue presented at the state level concerned the location, rather than the lawfulness of the picketing, there was no imper-
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tion of collective bargaining agents, 54 or resolve union membership
disputes. 55 However, the Court has rejected jurisdictional preemption in
cases where there is no threat of interference with the federal administrative
scheme and the aggrieved party does not have access to the Board's jurisdiction,'5 6 or where the protection of significant local interests depends on the
57
application of state law.
missible interference with the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction. Id. at 197200. The Court rejected the argument that all state action which affected picketing
was barred because of the protected nature of the activity. Id. at 200-08. The Court
also drew support for its holding from the fact that circumstances prevented Sears
from gaining access to the Board unless the union filed unfair labor practice charges.
Id at 201. The Court concluded, therefore, that Sears' only viable remedy was the
state trespass action. Id at 202. In addition to trespass actions, the Supreme Court
has permitted state interference with strikes or picketing if the union conduct endangered the public safety. For a discussion of these cases, see note 57 and accompanying text infra. But see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (trespass
theory not available to prohibit nonemployee union members from distributing
union literature on company property).
54. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 18 (1949). La Crosse Telephone involved a representation dispute between two
rival unions. Id at 20. One union had been voluntarily recognized by the employer
as the bargaining agent of the employees. Id. The rival union petitioned the state
Employment Relations Board, which initiated election procedures resulting in the
rival union's certification. Id The Supreme Court held that the NLRA preempted
application of the state procedures. Id at 24-27. The Supreme Court stated that
"certification by a State board under a different or conflicting theory of representation . . . [is] disruptive of the practice under the Federal act .

. . ."

Id. at 26. The

Court concluded that the problem of employee representation is a delicate one and
"[t]he uncertainty as to which board is master . . . can be as disruptive of peace
between various industrial factions as actual competition between two boards for
supremacy." Id Accord Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 U.S. 767 (1947) (state labor board could not exercise jurisdiction to consider
whether foreman bargaining units would be recognized since § 9(b) of the NLRA
gives the NLRB exclusive power to determine appropriate bargaining units).
55. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Lockridge involved an action brought in state court
by a former union member against the union for reinstatement to membership and
for damages resulting from wrongful discharge from membership in violation of the
union's constitution. Id at 277-79. As a result of his loss of membership, plaintiff was
discharged from employment under a union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 280. The state court entered judgment for the plaintiff. Id
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that resolution of such disputes was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, which preempted the state court's jurisdiction.
Id at 287-92. But cf International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958) (upholding state court damage award based upon violation of union's constitution and by-laws where there was no need to construe the union security clause of
the collective bargaining agreement).
56. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978). For a discussion of Sears, see note 53 supra.
57. See U.A.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1957); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355
U.S. 131 (1957); Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954); AllenBradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942). Russell, Youngdahl, Laburnum, and Allen-Bradley all held that a state law may
validly be applied to enjoin violent picketing, picketing with substantial threat of
imminent violence, and other activity inimical to the public safety. See Russell, 356
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Recently, the Supreme Court, in Local 926, InternationalUnion of Operating
Engineers v. Jones, 58 articulated a comprehensive test applicable in both substantive and jurisdictional preemption cases which incorporates previously
recognized exceptions to the general rule invalidating state laws which conflict with the federal scheme. 59 TheJones Court held that state laws curU.S. at 642-45; Youngdahl, 355 U.S. 139-40; Laburnum, 347 U.S. at 659-69; Allen-Bradley, 315 U.S. at 745-48. See also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners,
430 U.S. 290 (1977) (NLRA does not preempt state cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress brought by union member against the labor organization and its officials); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383
U.S. 53 (1966) (application of state defamation law to remedy tort occurring during
union organizational campaign not preempted by NLRA as the action was not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB).
The Supreme Court has stated that local interests must be considered when deciding NLRA preemption cases. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Sears Court explained that "the
history of the labor pre-emption doctrine in this Court does not support an approach
which sweeps away state-court jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to state
regulations without careful consideration of the relevant impact of such a jurisdictional bar on the various interests affected." Id at 188.
58. 103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983). At issue in jones was the question of whether the
NLRA preempted a state cause of action for intentional interference with contractual
relations. Id. at 1456. Plaintiff, a union member, argued that union leaders had
forced the company to discharge him shortly after his appointment to a supervisory
position. Id. Plaintiff then filed unfair labor practice charges against the union. Id
The Board's Regional Director dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. Id at
1457. Instead of appealing to the General Counsel, plaintiff proceeded in state court
against both the union and the company, claiming that the union coerced the company into breaching its employment contract with him. Id The Supreme Court
held that the NLRA preempted the state cause of action. Id. at 1458-62. The Court
reasoned that if the union coerced the employer to discharge the plaintiff, then its
conduct was arguably prohibited by the NLRA and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id at 1459-61. Moreover, the Court stated that the Regional
Director's dismissal for lack of evidence did not abrogate the NLRB's jurisdiction but
addressed the merits of the complaint. Id at 1461. See also Iron Workers v. Perko,
373 U.S. 701 (1963) (state cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations preempted by NLRA).
59. See 103 S. Ct. at 1458-59. The Court explained that when it is faced with a
decision as to whether "particular state causes of action or regulations may coexist
with the comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements
• . . set up in the NLRA," it has employed the following approach:
First, we determine whether the conduct that the state seeks to regulate or
to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited
by the NLRA. . . . [If so], otherwise applicable State law and procedures
are ordinarily preempted . . . . When, however, the conduct at issue is

only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the state of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or
sanction of the conduct .

. .

. The question of whether regulation should

be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves
a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by
Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in
terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted
cause of action to the state as a protection to its citizens.
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tailing NLRA protected rights are "ordinarily preempted" unless they
implicate local interests sufficient to outweigh their interference with the federal regulatory scheme, or regulate conduct that is only of "peripheral con60
cern" to the NLRA.
In applying the substantive-rights strand of preemption analysis, the
Supreme Court has twice considered the validity of state enactments which
set forth qualifications for union leadership. 6 1 In Hill v. Flori'da,62 a nonlicensed union representative challenged a Florida law requiring the licensing of all union business agents. 63 Under the challenged statute, a license
would be granted only if the applicant could meet certain specified conditions. 64 The Supreme Court held that the qualification provision was invaId at 1458-59.
60. Id at 1458-59. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 430
U.S. 290 (1977). The Farmer Court explained that the exceptions "in no way undermine the vitality of the pre-emption rule." Id at 297 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 180 (1967)). Rather, the Court stated that in a case where the exceptions
do apply they merely "highlight [our] responsibility . . . to determine the scope of
the general rule by examining the state interests in regulating the conduct in question
and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme." Id Farmer
involved an action brought by a discharged union member against the Union and its
officials, seeking damages arising from an alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id at 292-94. The Court recognized that there was some risk that the state
cause of action would touch on an area of primary federal concern, but "[v]iewed
. . . in light of the discrete concerns of the federal scheme and the state tort law, that
potential for interference is insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the State in protecting its citizens." Id. at 304. See also Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188 (1978);
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 152 (1960) ("doctrine of pre-emption does not
present a problem in physics but one of adjustment because of the interdependence of
federal and state interests and of the interaction of federal and state power"). For a
discussion of Sears, see note 53 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
DeVeau, see notes 67-73 and accompanying text uhfra.
61. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 766-86. Professor Gorman has
observed that the objection to these state provisions is that they interfere with employees' right to select representatives of their own choosing as guaranteed by §§ 1 &
7 of the NLRA and are therefore preempted. Id. at 770.
62. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
63. Id. at 540. The state statute defined business agent as "any person ... who
shall for a pecuniary or financial consideration, act or attempt to act [on behalf of a
union] in soliciting or receiving from any employer any right or privilege for employees.

. .

."

Id In addition, the law required that all business agent license applica-

tions be accompanied by a one-dollar fee and a statement signed by the officers of the
union setting forth the agent's authority. Id. Failure to comply with these provisions
was a misdemeanor. Id The Florida Attorney General brought suit under the licensing provisions to restrain Hill, a union business agent, from operating without a
license. Id at 540-41. An injunction was issued despite Hill's contention that the
qualification provision violated the NLRA by infringing on employee free choice of
bargaining representatives. Id For the text of the NLRA provisions guaranteeing
employee free choice of bargaining representatives, see note 21 supra.
64. 325 U.S. at 540. The statute required that the applicant be a citizen of the
United States for more than 10 years and a person of good moral character, and that
he have no record of felony convictions. Id
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lid since it inhibited worker freedom of choice by effectively imposing on
union members Florida's judgment regarding appropriate qualifications for
union leadership. 65 The Court reasoned that freedom of choice is fundamental to the policies of federal labor law and that the state's attempt to
' '66
restrict employee free choice was "repugnant to the NLRA.
Fifteen years later, in DeVeau v. Brazsted,67 the Court upheld a state law
which set qualifications for union leadership. 68 DeVeau arose in the context
of a congressionally-approved compact between New York and New Jersey
which sought to eliminate crime and corruption in waterfront employment
practices in the Port of New York. 69 Congress had extended its consent to
70
whatever additional legislation was necessary to implement the compact.
One of the implementation provisions which was subsequently enacted prohibited the collection of dues by a labor organization if any of its officers had
a prior felony conviction. 71 The Court upheld this provision, distinguishing
65. Id at 541-43. The Court stated that
[i]t is apparent that the Florida statute has been so construed and applied
that the union and its selected representative are prohibited from functioning as collective bargaining agents, or in any other capacity, except upon
conditions fixed by Florida. . . . Congress attached no conditions whatsoever to [worker's] freedom of choice .....
"Full freedom" to choose an
agent means freedom to pass upon that agent's qualifications . . . [t]o the
extent that [the provision] limits a union's choice of such an "agent" or
bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida's judgment for the worker's
judgment.
Id at 541.
66. Id at 542.
67. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
68. Id at 151-58. The qualification provision in DeVeau prohibited the solicitation or collection of union membership dues by a labor organization if any officer or
agent of such organization had been convicted of a felony unless that officer or agent
had received a pardon or certificate of good conduct removing the disability. Id at
145 (citing New York Waterfront Comm'n Act of 1953, § 8 (currently codified at
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9933 (McKinney 1974))).
69. 363 U.S. at 149-55. In an effort to combat crime in the Port of New York,
the legislatures of New York and New Jersey entered into an interstate compact to

create a Waterfront Commission with regulatory authority over waterfront employment practices. Id at 149. The United States Constitution requires that interstate
3.
compacts be submitted to Congress for its consent. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
Congress consented to the interstate compact. 363 U.S. at 150 (citing Pub. L. No. 83252, ch. 407, 67 Stat. 541-57 (1953)). The compact's preamble set forth congressional
approval for both the compact and "the carrying out and effectuation of said comId. at 151.
pact, and enactments in furtherance thereof .......
Three years after enactment of the challenged qualifications provision, the President of Local 1346, International Longshoremen's Association was notified that because the organization's secretary-treasurer had been convicted of a felony, the union
would be prohibited from collecting membership dues until he was removed. d at
146. The secretary-treasurer, who had pled guilty to a charge of grand larceny 33
years before the enactment of the Waterfront Commission Act, challenged the Act on
the grounds that it restricted employee free choice of a bargaining representative and
was preempted by the NLRA. Id
70. Id at 151.
71. Id.at 145. Exceptions were provided where the officer had been pardoned
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Hill on the basis of Congress' approval of both the compact and its implementing legislation. 7 2 Because one of the main goals of the compact was to
keep criminals away from the waterfront, a goal which had been the subject
of an independent congressional investigation, the Court concluded that the
qualification provision was within the scope of Congress' approval and not
contrary to federal labor policy. 73 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the NLRA preempted all restrictions upon employees' freedom to
74
choose representatives.
by either state's governor or where he had received a certificate of good conduct from
a parole board. Id.
72. Id. at 163. The Court noted that Congress' consent to the compact was not
perfunctory. Id. at 149-50. It had conducted its own investigations into the problems
plaguing the waterfront and concluded that the Act was a viable means of solving
these problems. Id.
The appellant had argued that since § 8 was not actually part of the compact,
Congress did not expressly approve it. Id at 150-51. However, the Court responded
by stating that Congress was indeed aware of the provision since it had already been
enacted by New York, and since it had been urged as a ground for opposition to the
compact by the union during the approval, hearings. Id. Consequently, the Court
concluded, "It is in light of this legislative history that the compact was approved,
and that congressional consent was given to 'enactments in furtherance thereof.' " Id.
73. Id. at 153-57. The court had characterized the first step of its preemption
analysis as a determination of whether "Congress, with a lively regard for its own
federal labor policy, [would] find a true, real frustration . . . of that policy ..
" Id.
at 153. The Court concluded that Congress' consent to additional legislation to effectuate the compact was a sign that Congress viewed state regulations aimed at
preventing crime in areas where state concerns are legitimate as compatible with
federal labor law. Id. at 154. The Court explained, "It is instructive that this unique
provision has occurred in connection with approval of a compact dealing with the
prevention of crime where, because of the peculiarly local nature of the problem, the
inference is strongest that local policies are not to be thwarted." Id
74. Id at 152. The Court observed, "Obviously the [NLRA] does not exclude
every state policy that may in fact restrict the complete freedom of a group of employees to designate 'representatives of their own choosing.' " Id. The Court gave
the example that union officials are not immune from criminal prosecution and incarceration simply because they have been chosen as bargaining representatives. Id.
Rather, the crucial inquiry was whether the congressional purpose behind the NLRA
was incompatible with the narrow restriction presented. Id. at 153. Applying this
standard to the New Jersey-New York compact, the Court concluded that it was not.
Id.
The appellant had also argued that the qualification provision was preempted
by § 504 of the LMRDA, which temporarily prohibited convicted felons from holding union office. Id. at 155. For a discussion of the LMRDA, see notes 25-29 and
accompanying text supra. The Court rejected the argument, stating that the fact that
Congress itself imposed qualifications for union leadership "is surely evidence that
Congress does not view such a restriction as incompatible with its labor policies." Id
at 156. In addition, the Court noted that when Congress intended for the LMRDA
to preempt state law, it included specific provisions expressly excluding the operation
of state law. Id at 156. The Court concluded that the absence of a specific preemptory provision accompanying the LMRDA's qualification provision was alone "sufficient reason for not deciding that [the LMRDA] pre-empts § 8 of the Waterfront
Commission Act." Id. In addition, the Court emphasized that the LMRDA contained a provision allowing states to enforce their criminal laws against union leaders
and provided that its provisions, except where explicitly stated, did not reduce the
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Congress has facilitated preemption analysis under ERISA by including
a provision requiring the preemption of all state laws if they "relate to any
employee benefit plan" governed by the federal Act. 75 As a result, the
Supreme Court has characterized pension plan regulation as "exclusively a
federal concern." 76 Federal courts have found that ERISA preempted state
laws prohibiting worker's compensation benefits from being used to offset
pension payments, 77 regulating health care benefit plans,78 and barring discriminatory allocations of plan proceeds.79 However, state laws regulating
areas of traditionally local interest are not preempted. 80
responsibilities of any union official under state law. Id.at 157 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 604, 603(a) (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 524, 523 (1976))).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). ERISA § 514(a) provides that the Act's provisions "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan .... ." Id.
76. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1981). The
Alessi Court explained that ERISA requires preemption of a broad range of state law
directly or indirectly intruding on the federal regulatory scheme. d.at 525. For the
text of ERISA's preemption provision, see note 75 supra. The Court reasoned that
with the enactment of ERISA, "Congress intended to depart from its previous legislation that 'envisioned the exercise of state power over pension funds .... .'" Id.at
523 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 512, 514 (1978)). For a
discussion of preemption analysis under ERISA, see generally Kilberg & Heron, The
Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L.J. 383; Macey, Labor Pains: ERISA
and the Evolving Doctrine of Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to Employee Benefit
Plans, 4 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 35-44 (1978).

77. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). Alessi involved an
action by retired employees claiming that their employer had violated a state law
prohibiting worker compensation benefits from being used to offset pension benefits.
Id at 508. The Supreme Court held that the state law was preempted because it
found that the state statute "related to" an employee benefit plan regulated by ERISA. Id at 523-26. The ,4lessi Court reasoned as follows: "Whatever the purpose or
purposes of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it 'relate[s] to pension plans'
governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits-integration-that is permitted by federal law." Id.at 524.
78. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.) (state Health-Care
Service Plan Act preempted by ERISA because it directly regulates employee benefits plans), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp.
695 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act preempted by ERISA),
aJfd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
79. Pervel Indus. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights, 468 F. Supp. 490
(D. Conn. 1978), affd, 503 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
Pervel involved an action by a pregnant employee who had been denied disability
payments under an employee benefit plan. Id.at 492. State law prohibited denial of
employer-maintained plan benefits to workers disabled as a result of pregnancy. Id
at 491. The district court in Pervel concluded that the state's "anti-discrimination
law, legislating specifically on the subject of disability benefits, is a law that relates to
an employee benefit plan." Id at 492. Contra Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979) (ERISA not intended by Congress
to preempt state anti-discrimination laws), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980).
80. See Carpenter's Pension Trust for S. California v. Kronschabel, 632 F.2d 745
(9th Cir.) (ERISA does not preempt state order requiring payment of pension plan
proceeds to beneficiaries' spouse as part of community property settlement), cert. dened, 453 U.S. 722 (1980); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (California community property law not preempted by ERISA), affd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.
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Section 411 of ERISA regulates the qualifications of pension plan administrators by prohibiting a convicted felon from serving as a plan fiduciary
"during or for five years after such conviction or after the end of such impris*"...
81 In InternationalLongshoremen's Assoc. v.
onment whichever is the later .
Waterfront Commission v. Waterfront Commission of New York Habor,8 2 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that, despite ERISA's broad preemptive language, 83 the qualification provision did
not supersede all concurrent state law.8 4 The plan fiduciary, who was disqualified under state law because of a federal felony conviction, argued that
the ERISA provision, which defined conviction as occurring on the date of
the "final sustaining of such judgment on appeal, ' 8 5 preempted the state
law, which defined conviction as occurring on the date of the trial court's
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). Accord In re Marriage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp.
666 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See also A.T.&T. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (state
order directing garnishment of pension plan benefits to satisfy family support obligations is not preempted); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388
(E.D. Cal. 1981) (ERISA does not preempt state cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation of the type and adequacy of the benefits provided by a medical plan).
Commentators have noted that most local interest-federal interest conflicts have
arisen in the domestic relations area. Kilberg & Heron, supra note 75, at 405. These
conflicts are said to require a balancing of the state and federal interests, the outcome
of which "will often depend upon which state interest is cited as the major one
against which the federal interest is balanced." Id at 419-20. The authors contend
that the conflict between the language of ERISA and state court support and alimony decrees is "real" and that although "courts have generally reached the just
conclusion in these cases,. . . [they] have been forced to stretch the plain meaning of
the federal statute to do so." Id at 420.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). For a discussion of this regulation, see note 30 and
accompanying text supra.
82. 495 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 642
F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 966 (1981).
83. See note 75 supra.
84. 495 F. Supp. at 1124. The action involved a suit by a plan fiduciary who
was dismissed under the qualification provisions of the Waterfront Commission Act.
Id at 1106-09. Amendments to those provisions prohibits any convicted felon from
serving as an officer, agent, or employee of a labor organization or fund "unless he
has been pardoned or received the requisite certificate of good conduct," makes it
unlawful to "'knowingly permit such convicted person to assume or hold any office,' " and imposes criminal penalties for violations of these prohibitions. Id. at 1108
(quoting Waterfront Commission Act, § 8 (currently codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 9933 (McKinney 1974))). Plaintiff, a disqualified official, was convicted of
violating a federal law prohibiting officials of labor organizations from receiving
loans from employers of unionized workers. Id at 1108 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)
(1976)). Because the ERISA qualification provision defined conviction as occurring
on the date of the final affirmance of such judgment on appeal, plaintiff argued that
the state act was preempted since it defined conviction as occuring on the date the
trial court rendered judgment. Id at 1109.
85. Id. at 1109. ERISA § 411(c)(1) provides as follows:
A person shall be deemed to have been "convicted" from the date of the
judgment of the trial court or the date of the final sustaining of such judgment on appeal, whichever is the later event.
29 U.S.C. § IlIl(c)(1) (1976).
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judgment. 86 The court held that ERISA did not preempt the state law since
"[a] rule that permits removal of union officers upon a guilty verdict, or
'87
upon sentence, interferes only marginally with federal labor policy."
New Jersey's Casino Control Act of 1977 both established the Casino
Control Commission8 8 and detailed the conditions under which the casino
gambling industry would be regulated.8 9 Section 93 of the Act requires that
86. 495 F. Supp. at 1109.
87. Id at 1124. The court addressed plaintiff's contentions that the state law
was preempted by both LMRDA § 502(c) and ERISA § 411 (c)(1). Id. The court
noted that simply because both the LMRDA and ERISA "deem union officers 'convicted' upon successful exhaustion of all appeals" does not mean that Congress "foreclose[d] a state from adopting a more restrictive policy." Id. The court reasoned that
"[i]f under DeVeau New York may lawfully prohibit some convicted persons from
serving as union officials even though federal law would allow them to serve, it follows that New York should be permitted to remove 'convicted' officers a few months
sooner than federal law mandates." Id For a discussion of DeVeau, see notes 68-74
and accompanying text supra. See also Local 1804, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 85 N.J. 606, 428 A.2d 1283 (1981). In Local
1804, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed a similar challenge to the Waterfront
Commission Act's qualification provisions. Id. at 608-10, 428 A.2d at 1284-85. Applying an interest-balancing test, the court held that ERISA did not preempt the
state act since both were aimed at the prevention of crime and corruption and the
state law did not obstruct ERISA in any "significant sense." The New Jersey
Supreme Court explained,
The evaluation requires a balancing of the potential for interference by
section 8 with ERISA and the willingness of Congress to tolerate that interference. . . . Both Section 8 of the compact and Section 411(c) of ERISA
require removal of union officers for their misconduct. Although the statutes have different purposes, they both protect the employees, their unions
and the public. The provision of Section 8. . .differs minimally from the
provision of ERISA . . . . Thus viewed, Section 8 does not impinge upon
Section 411 (c) in any significant sense.
Id. at 615-16, 428 A.2d at 1288-89.
88. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to 5:12-152 (West Supp. 1983). The Commission is established within the Department of Treasury. Id § 5:12-50. The Commission's authority includes the power to issue subpoenas to compel attendance of
witnesses at a Commission hearing, conduct investigative hearings, and require a witness to answer any question. Id. §§ 5:12-65 to 5:12-67. The Commission may, if
necessary, confer on the witness testimonial immunity. Id. Also included within the
Commission's authority is the power to collect fees or penalties required pursuant to
the provisions of the Act, make such regulations as "it may deem necessary or desirable for the public interest in carrying out the provisions of [the] act," including regulations excluding certain individuals from any "licensed casino establishment," and
conduct meetings and make recommendations regarding the "operation and administration of casino control laws." Id §§ 5:12-68, 5:12-73. Finally, "[t]he commission
may exercise any proper power or authority necessary to perform the duties assigned
to it by law, and no specific enumeration of powers in [the] act shall be read to limit
the authority of the commission to administer [the] act." Id § 5:12-75.
89. See id.§§ 5:12-63 to 5:12-75. The Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The Casino Control Commission shall have general responsibility for the implementation of this act . . . including, without limitation, the responsibility: (a) To hear
and decide promptly and in reasonable order all license, registra/zon, certificate, and
permit applications and causes affecting the granting, suspension, revocation, or renewal thereof ..
" Id. § 5:12-63 (emphasis in the original to show recent amendment). In addition, the Act requires that the Commission shall
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every labor organization seeking to represent casino employees register annually with the Commission. 90 In addition, section 93 prohibits the collection
of membership dues and the administration of pension and welfare funds by
the union registrant if any of its officers fail to satisfy the licensee qualification provisions of the Act. 9 1 The criteria for officer disqualification include
convictions for any one of the number of designated offenses and identification as a career offender or as a member or associate of a career offender
92
cartel.
assure that licenses, certificates, or permits shall not be issued to nor held
by, nor shall there by any material involvement, directly or indirectly, with

the licensed casino operation or the ownership thereof by, unqualified or
disqualified persons or unsuitable person, or persons whose operations are
conducted in a manner not conforming with the provisions of this act. For
the purposes of this section, "unqualified person," "disqualified person," or
"unsuitable person" shall mean any person who is found by the commission
to be disqualified pursuant to the criteria set forth in section 86 . . . or to
lack the financial responsibility and capability specified in the provisions of
Section 84.
Id. § 5:12-64 (footnotes omitted). The Act requires licensing of casinos and their supervisory personnel, casino employees, and all industries offering goods or services to
the casinos. Id. §§ 5:12-89 to 5:12-92.
The Act also creates the Division of Gaming Enforcement. Id. §§ 5:12-76 to
5:12-79. Established within the Department of Law and Public Safety, which is
headed by the Attorney General, the Division is charged with responsibility for investigating all applicants for licenses, certificates, or permits, and prosecuting before the
Commission or in the state criminal courts all proceedings for violations of the Act or
regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.
90. I. § 5:12-93(a). Section 93(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Each labor organization, union or affiliate seeking to represent employees
licensed or regittered under this act and employed by a casino licensee shall
register with the Commission annually, and shall disclose such information
to the Commission as the Commission may require, including the names of
all affiliated organizations, pension and welfare systems and all officers and
agents of such organizations and systems.
Id (emphasis in original to show recent amendment). "Casino hotel employees" include those individuals performing "service or custodial duties not directly related to
operations of the casino, including without limitations, bartenders, waiters, waitresses, maintenance personnel, kitchen staff, but whose employment duties do not
require or authorize access to the casino." Id. § 5:12-8.
91. Id. § 5:12-93(b). Section 93(b) provides as follows:
No labor organization, union, or affiliate registered or required to be registered pursuant to this section and representing or seeking to represent employees licensed or regzitered under this act may receive any dues from any
employee licensed or registered under this act and employed by a casino licensee or its agent, or administer any pension or welfare funds, if any officer, agent, or principal employee of the labor organization, union, or
affiliate is disqualified in accordance with the criteria set forth in Section 86
of this Act. The Commission may for the purposes of this Subsection waive
any disqualification criterion consistent with the public policy of this act
and upon a finding that the interests of justice so require.
Id. 5:12-93(b) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original to show recent amendment).
92. See id § 5:12-86. Section 93 cross references to the disqualification criteria
provided in § 86. Id. § 5:12-86(c)(4). Section 86() of the Act provides as follows:
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Against this background, the Third Circuit in Danziger considered
whether section 93 of the New Jersey Casino Control Act 93 was preempted
by section 7 of the NLRA. 94 Judge Gibbons reviewed the history of New
95
Jersey's regulation of gambling revenues for public or charitable purposes.
Judge Gibbons noted that in authorizing casino gambling, the state exacted
a tax on private revenues, which was to support programs for the elderly and
disabled. 96 Although the casino industry is privately run, the Danzzger court
The identification of the applicant or any person who is required to be
qualified under this act as a condition of a casino license as a career offender or a member of a career offender cartel in such a manner which
creates a reasonable belief that the association is of such a nature as to be
inimical to the policy of this act and to gaming operations. For purposes of
this section, career offender shall be defined as any person whose behavior is
pursued in an occupational manner or context for the purpose of economic
gain, utilizing such methods as are deemed criminal violations of the public
policy of this State. A career offender cartel shall be defined as any group
of persons who operate together as career offenders ....
Id. § 5:12-86(0. The policies of the Act referenced above are generally to maintain
"the public confidence and trust in the credibility and integrity of the regulatory
process and of casino operations." Id. 5:12-1(b)(6). A union may therefore be disqualified under § 93 if an officer, agent, or principal employee is an "associate of any
person whose behavior is pursued in an occupational manner or context for the purpose of economic gain, utilizing such methods as are deemed criminal violations of
the public policy of [New Jersey]." Id § 5:12-86(0. For a discussion of state regulation of casino gambling and restrictions on union leadership, see generally Note, State
Regulation of Castno Gambhing. Constitutzonal Limtations and Federal Labor Law Preemption,
FORDHAM L.R. 1038, 1038-48 (1981).

49

93. 709 F.2d at 823-30 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93(a) (West Supp. i983)).
For a discussion of section 93, see notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
94. 709 F.2d at 823-30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)). For a discussion of the
Union's contentions that § 93 of the Casino Control Act interferes with the NLRA
§ 7 rights of its members, see note 8 supra. The Union also argued that the New
Jersey statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 709 F.2d at 833. However, the court did not reach these arguments because its decision on the preemption
issue was sufficient to dispose of the appeal. Id
95. 709 F.2d at 821-23. The court noted that prior to 1844, New Jersey was very
tolerant of gambling and authorized numerous lotteries to raise revenues for public
or charitable purposes. Id at 821-22. However, the state constitution of 1844 outlawed all lotteries, and an 1897 amendment prohibited all gambling. Id at 822 (cit-

ing N.J.

CONST.

of 1844, art. IV, § 7,

2). That prohibition lasted until 1939, when

a second amendment was passed, allowing pari-mutuel betting on horse races in order to raise state revenues. Id (citing 1939 N.J. LAws at 1063). The 1947 constitution prohibited gambling except where authorized by general election or conducted
2). A
by charitable organizations. Id. (citing N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § 7,
1969 amendment authorized state lotteries if the entire proceeds were applied to education and state institutions. Id (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:9-1 to 5:9-25 (West
1973)).

96. Id. at 821-23. Judge Gibbons observed that in 1976 the constitution was
again amended to permit the legislature to authorize casino gambling in Atlantic
City. Id However, the revenues derived must be applied to benefit the elderly and
disabled. Id Unlike the state lottery, the casinos are privately owned. Id Judge

Gibbons noted, however, the state does have a "direct financial stake" in casino operation because it imposes an eight percent tax on gross revenues. Id at 822-23. Since
the casinos are privately owned, the state did not argue that they fit within the gov-
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recognized that the interests of the state and the casino owners were "closely
97
aligned economically."
Judge Gibbons then considered the enactment of the NLRA and the
development of a federal labor law policy.98 Because the drafters of section
7 were aware of labor racketeering, the court viewed the omission of union
leadership qualifications as a conscious choice in favor of employees' free
choice of collective bargaining representatives.99 The Danziger court believed that Hiill v. Florida, where the Supreme Court held that employee free
choice could not be "frustrated by state legislation,"

00

provided the "defini-

ernment-employer exception of § 2(2) of the NLRA. Id at 823 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976)).
97. Id at 823.
98. Id. at 823-24. Prior to expansive commerce power interpretations, Judge
Gibbons explained, "[S]tate law interference with efforts of employees to choose their
own collective bargaining representative was largely beyond the reach of congressional enactments." Id at 823 (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(invalidating federal statute making it unlawful to discriminate against employees
because of union membership)). For a discussion of Adatr and early commerce power
interpretations, see notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
The court noted, however, that a 1930 United States Supreme Court decision
held that the Railway Labor Act of 1916 was constitutional, and effectively overruled
Adair, thus setting the stage for the modern era of labor relations laws. Id. at 823
(citing Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930)). The first federal statute explicitly granting employees the right
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, the court continued, was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Id. After the NIRA,
Congress enacted the NLRA which also granted employees the right to choose their
own representatives. Id However, the Danziger court noted that, while provisions in
prior acts were "largely precatory" and contained "no effective enforcement mechanism," the NLRA made employee free choice and self-organization "a federal statutory right, the interference with which is an unfair labor practice which the National
Labor Relations Board has the power to prevent." Id. at 823-24.
99. 709 F.2d at 823-29. The court concluded that the omission from the NLRA
of any qualification provisions was intentional and therefore manifested Congress'
desire to allow workers full freedom of choice in the selection of their representatives.
Id. The Court explained as follows:
When the NLRA was under consideration opponents of the legislation
called to the attention of Congress the issue of labor racketeering. Thus
Congress was not unmindful of the generic problem which Section 93 of the
Casino Control Act now addresses in a specific industry. Despite these
rather forceful expressions from opponents of the NLRA, however, the 74th
Congress placed no limitations in section 7 or section 8 upon the persons
who could be chosen as collective bargaining representatives. . . . [Tihe
omission of racketeering limitations on qualifications for designation as a
collective bargaining representative plainly was a conscious legislative
choice both in the 1933 NIRA and the 1935 NLRA.
Id at 824 (footnote omitted). Congress, in the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), has since set down various qualifications for union
officerships one of which prohibits a person from holding office if he has been convicted of a felony within the last five years. Id at 827 n.8 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 504
(1976)). For a discussion of the Danziger court's treatment of the LMRDA and how it
relates to the preemption issue, see notes 107-11 and accompanying text infra.
100. 709 F.2d at 824 (quotingHllv. Florida, 325 U.S. at 542). In addition to the
substantive interference with employee § 7 rights, the court concluded that the Coin-
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tive interpretation of the preemptive effect of section 7.'"1 Judge Gibbons
drew from Hill the principle that states may not fix standards or qualifications for union officers which would preclude them from being chosen as
bargaining agents.10 2 Because this was precisely the effect of New Jersey's
casino regulation, Judge Gibbons concluded that the "Hill Court's holding
on the preclusive effect of section 7 [was] controlling. . . unless it ha[d] been
modified by subsequent federal legislation or overruled by the Supreme
' 10 3

Court."

The Danziger court took note that Congress undertook major revision of
the NLRA in 1947, three years after Hi'll was decided. 10 4 Although Congress amended both section 7 and section 8, it did not change the provisions
regarding employee free choice of bargaining representative. 10 5 Judge Gibbons concluded that Congress' silence in this instance "must be considered
[an] approval of the holding in Hill that state law on eligibility is preempted." 10 6 Further, the court found that cases subsequent to 1947 not only
mission's disqualification of the union officers was also preempted under the "primary jurisdiction" theory. Id. at 825. The court noted that the NLRB had already
certified the union as the collective bargaining agent for casino employees and that
the Commissions' action would "render the union ineffective as a bargaining agent
unless it dismiss[ed] three key officers." Id at 825. Since the NLRB has "exclusive
authority" to certify union bargaining agents, the court concluded that any state
action would interfere with that authority. Id (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976)). For a
discussion of the primary jurisdiction theory, see notes 51-57 and accompanying test
supra.

101. 709 F.2d at 825 (citing Hilv. Florida, 325 U.S. at 542). The Danzger court
also concluded that the Supreme Court had provided the definitive interpretation of
the preemptive effect of § 8, which defines unfair labor practices that are to be exclusively enforced by the NLRB. Id at 825 (citing Bethlehem Steel v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947)). For a discussion of Bethlehem Steel, see
note 21 supra.
102. 709 F.2d at 825 (citing Hill v.Florida, 325 U.S. at 545 (Stone, C.J.,
concurring)).
103. Id.at 825.
104. Id (citing Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, ch.
120, § 7, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976))).
105. Id.The court noted that in the 1947 enactment of the LMRA, Congress
had seen fit to amend various provisions of the NLRA. Id Congress retained the
first portion of § 7 guaranteeing to workers the freedom to choose their bargaining
representatives, but added a correlative "right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a)(3)." Id (quoting U.S.C. § 157 (1976)). The Danziger court further observed that Congress addressed the labor racketeering problem in the LMRA by
making it unlawful for employers to pay, or for labor representatives to receive,
money or other things of value. Id at 826. The court found it significant that Congress did not set down qualifications for union leadership. Id (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1976)).
106. Id at 826 (citing Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982)). Judge Gibbons cited Curran for the proposition that when Congress
amends certain sections, and leaves intact other provisions of a statute under which
federal courts have implied a cause of action, this silence is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intends to preserve that remedy. Id.(citing 456 U.S. at 374-82).
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failed to modify Hi/l, but demonstrated a policy that a court had to find
specific congressional deference to state regulation in a particular area before
it could validate any state regulation of employee rights protected by the
NLRA.

10 7

Judge Gibbons observed that when Congress next dealt with the collective bargaining relationship in the LMRDA, it specifically addressed eligibility for union office.'
In section 504 of the LMRDA, he noted that
Congress prohibited anyone, who within five years had been convicted of a
felony or who had been a member of the Communist Party, from holding
union office.' 0 9 The LMRDA did not expressly authorize state regulation of
leadership qualifications, although it explicitly preserved state remedies in
two other sections.' 10 The Danziger court believed that the absence of a sav107. Id at 825-27. In 1947 Congress, amended § 10 of the NLRA to permit the
Board to cede jurisdiction to state agencies in certain instances, thus correcting the

"no-man's land problem of NLRB declination of jurisdiction and state agency lack
thereof." Id at 825-26 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)). However, the Third Circuit
emphasized that the Supreme Court had held that § 10 was "the exclusive means
whereby States may be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has
entrusted to the [NLRBI." Id at 826 (quoting Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1, 9 (1953)). Quoting from Cuss, the Danziger court reasoned,
"Congress demonstrated that it knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states.
Congress knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the field that the
act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned'
and demonstrated its ability to spell out with particularity those areas in
which it desired state regulation to be operative."
Id at 826 (quoting Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 9 (1953) (quoting
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 430 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1958))).
The Danziger court also noted that in the period between the 1947 amendments
and the Guss decision, the Supreme Court had held that § 7 preempted both the
strike-vote provisions of the Michigan Labor Mediation Law and the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law. Id at 826 (citing Amagamated Ass'n of St. Employees,
Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Automobile
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950)).
Judge Gibbons further pointed out that five years after Guss the Supreme Court
reiterated the authority of Hll, O'Brien, and Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
when it held that a state court could not set aside a collective bargaining agreement
even though it violated state antitrust laws. Id. at 826 (citing Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959)). For a discussion of Oliver, see note 48
and accompanying text supra. Thus, the court concluded that "as federal law stood
after the enactment of the LMRA, there could be no room for avoiding, in a case
such as this, the binding authority of the Hill decision." 709 F.2d at 827.
108. 709 F.2d at 827 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)). For a discussion of
the LMRDA, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. Section 504 of the
LMRDA prohibits convicted felons and members of the Communist Party from
holding union office. See 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1976). For the text of section 504, see note
25 supra.
109. 709 F.2d at 827 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1976)).
110. Id at 827-28 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 523(c), 524 (1976)). The court noted that
LMRDA § 604 allows application of state criminal laws to union leaders and
§ 603(a) preserves state-law remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty. Id. The Danzzger court noted that because many of the proscribed activities were already crimes
under state law and not protected by § 7 of the NLRA, "Congress decreed in section
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ings clause accompanying section 504 evinced a congressional intent that
federal law alone should establish qualifications for union leadership, and
that the rule in Hill v. Florida had been preserved. I I I Moreover, the court
quoted the Senate Report on the LMRDA as an explicit statement that the
section 504 qualification provision "is designed to further. . . [establish] certain standards for persons holding union office-a matter within the purview
'
of the federal government."' 2
Judge Gibbons asserted that Hill represented the first of two preemption doctrines under federal labor law, that legislation bearing on protected
employee activity was clearly preempted. 1' 3 In both Hill and the present
cases he noted, the challenged state law directly related to employee free
choice in selection of bargaining representatives, a specifically protected
604 of the LMRDA that it would not 'impair or diminish the authority of any State
to enact and enforce general criminal law.... .. Id at 827 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 524
(1976)). According to the court, § 604
was included in recognition of the holdings in Garner v. Teamsters Union . . .
and San Diego Buildtg Trades Council v. Garmon . . . that in the field of labor
law pre-emption might apply not only with respect to activity protected by
section 7, but also with respect to activity prohibited by a federal regulatory

scheme. Those cases also influenced Congress to include in section 603(a) of
the LMRDA a savings clause preserving state law remedies for breach of
fiduciary duties.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1976)).
111. Id. at 828. The Danziger court explained as follows:

[Iln 1959 Congress, fully aware of the holding in Hi/l. Florida that section 7
preempted state disqualification laws, of the rule of statutory interpretation
. . . that Congressional deference to state law must be specific, and of
[Supreme Court] holdings that even state regulation of activity prohibited
by federal law is preempted, chose to legislate on the subject of union officer
disqualification with no deference to state authority, either with respect to
parallel disqualification criteria or with respect to conflicting disqualification criteria. Since both disqualification and preemption were carefully
considered in the same legislation no intention can be attributed to Congress other than preservation of the Hill v. Florida rule.
Id (citations omitted). Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the failure of either
the Supreme Court or Congress to modify Hill indicated their affirmance of its rule.

Id.
112. Id at 828 (quoting S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, repritedin 1959
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2366).
113. Id at 828. The court stated that when activities are specifically protected
by the NLRA, state law is necessarily preempted. d (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 349 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). Judge Gibbons quoted the following
rationale of the Garmon Court:
Choice of a bargaining representative is totally protected by section 7, except to the extent that the bargaining representative may be disqualified
under section 503(a) of the LMRDA. No section 504 LMRDA disqualification applies to this Union's officers. Thus there is neither occasion nor justification for engaging in weighing or balancing. State disqualification
statutes which go beyond section 504 simply cannot operate in interstate
commerce to disqualify otherwise eligible bargaining representatives.
Id. at 828-29 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 349 U.S. 236, 244
(1959)).
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right under NLRA section 7.1 14 Judge Gibbons felt that the second preemption doctrine, which balanced state and federal interests where the activity
in question was federally regulated but not specifically protected, was inapplicable. 1 15 For this reason, the Danztger court did not believe that a consideration of the relative weight of New Jersey's interest in regulation of
16
gambling was appropriate.'
The Danzzger court rejected the Commission's argument that DeVeau v.
Braz~ted impaired the authority of Hi'll, because the court regarded the explicit congressional approval of the state measures taken in DeVeau as the
determinative factor, and one which distinguished it from the present
case. 117
Judge Gibbons also rejected the Commission's attempt to distinguish
the regulation of a single industry of peculiarly local concern from the general regulation involved in H'I.'1 18 Even if section 93 were limited to a sin114. Id at 828. For a discussion of the employee rights protected by § 7 of the
NLRA, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra. The court found that the New
Jersey Casino Control Act directly interfered with protected employee choice because
it would disqualify one of the Union's officers for a prior conviction which was well
outside of the five-year period provided by § 504 of the LMRDA. 709 F.2d at 828.
115. 709 F.2d at 828. Where the activities which a state purports to regulate are
not specifically protected by § 7, but are nevertheless federally regulated, Judge Gibbons found that the Supreme Court had mandated "a case by case determination of
the interaction between state and federal regulatory schemes." Id (citing Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (state cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress not preempted by NLRA); Amalgamated
Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971)
(state law applied to union membership disputes preempted by NLRA); Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (state cause of action for defamation not preempted by NLRA)).
116. See id. at 828-29. Judge Gibbons stated that the New Jersey disqualification provision was absolutely prohibited and "[t]here is neither occasion nor justification for weighing or balancing. State disqualification statutes which go beyond
[LMRDA] section 504 simply cannot operate in interstate commerce to disqualify
otherwise eligible bargaining representatives." Id
117. Id at 829 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. at 144). The court dismissed
the contention that DeVeau overruled Hll, because it interpreted Congress' approval
of the interstate compact involved in DeVeau as an approval of the state qualification
provision passed incident thereto. Id at 829. In addition, the court found it significant that in the plurality opinion in DeVeau, Justice Frankfurter, who had dissented
in Hi/I, was "careful not to intimate that Hill was overruled." Id. For a discussion of
Hill and DeVeau, see notes 61-74 and accompanying text supra.
118. 709 F.2d at 829. The Commission contended that Hll involved a statute
applicable to all labor unions, while the qualification provision before the Third Circuit was limited to the casino industry and involved a matter of strong local concern.
Id The Danziger court noted, however, that the qualification provision was not limited to the casino workers but also applied to casino hotel employees, who do not
actually work in the casinos. Id In addition, the court found the strong local concern argument unpersuasive. Id It asserted that a similar argument was raised and
dismissed when the Supreme Court struck down a law preventing strikes against public utilities despite pleas that the local interest justified the law. Id (citing Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1950)). For a discussion of Amalgamated, see note 47 supra.
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gle industry, he reasoned, the state had not exercised its power to assign
119
Although the state might in
casino gambling to a political subdivision.
this way bring the industry within the government-employer exception to
the NLRA, Judge Gibbons continued, "Congress has not . . . given the

states the further option of deciding for themselves which areas of private
enterprise can be so cloaked with the mantle of state interest as to be placed
120
outside the preemptive scope of the NLRA."
The Third Circuit next considered whether the qualification provision
in section 93 of the New Jersey Casino Control Act was preempted by ERISA.12 1 Judge Gibbons noted that section 514(a) of ERISA provides, with
few exceptions, that ERISA shall supersede all state laws relating to employee benefit plans.' 2 2 Since section 93 restricted the qualifications of administrators of "employee benefit plans"' 23 within ERISA's coverage, the
court quickly concluded that section 93 and ERISA could not "lawfully co119. See 709 F.2d 829-30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (government employers not subject to NLRA); NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971)
(utility district administered by persons responsible to public officials comes within
government employer exception to the NLRA)). Judge Gibbons pointed out that
New Jersey had exercised this option with respect to its lottery. Id at 830 (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. 4:9-4 (West 1973)).

120. Id at 830. The Danziger court refused to recognize the state's prerogative
to specifically regulate the gambling industry simply on the basis that it "is uniquely
attractive to unwholesome elements in our society."

Id

Concern over organized

crime, the court reasoned, could not be limited to gambling, because other industries
of vital interest to the state, such as the solid waste industry, had been identified as
susceptible to criminal infiltration. Id. at n. 10. The court viewed organized crime as
a national problem which Congress had addressed in criminal statutes and in allowing state criminal law to operate against union officials. Id. at 830 (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 524, 1961-1968 (1982)). Judge Gibbons concluded, "That problem cannot
be relied upon by the states to Balkanize the law with respect to choice of collective

bargaining representatives in non-exempt interstate commerce." Id at 830.
121. Id at 830-31.
122. Id

at 830 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976)).

Judge Gibbons noted that

§ 514 does not apply to preempt the following: (1) causes of action arising before
January 1, 1975 (effective date of ERISA); (2) state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities; and (3) any generally applicable criminal law of a state. Id (citing

29 U.S.C. §§ 4144(a)(1), (2)(A)(4) (1976)). The Danziger court noted that the Third
Circuit had previously held that "the legislative history of ERISA's preemption section .. .make[s] plain that the preemptive intent is just as broad as its language
suggests." Id.at 830 (quoting Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238,
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
1250 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub noma.
(1981)).
123. Id.at 830-31. The Danziger court dismissed the Commission's assertion that
the qualification provision did not "relate to any employee benefit plan," finding
that the "plain language" of the provision precluded any such contention. Id
Judge Gibbons further stated that ERISA provides that state statutes relating to

employee benefit plans "are preempted even when their effect is indirect." Id at 831
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1976)).

Moreover, he noted, the Supreme Court has

"definitively construed" ERISA's preemption sections as precluding the states
"'from avoiding through form the substance of the preemption provision.' " Id
(quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981)).
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Having found that the union's preemption claims were meritorious, the
court turned to the question of whether the request for preliminary injunctive relief should have been granted.125 Judge Gibbons found that there had
been a strong likelihood that the union would ultimately succeed on the
merits, 126 a strong likelihood of harm pendente i'e to the Union's status as a
collective bargaining representative,12 7 no likelihood that commensurate
harm to the defendant would have resulted from the grant of pendenle h'te
relief, 128 and a strong national public interest in preventing the unlawful
exercise of state agency jurisdiction in a preempted area. 129 Therefore,
124. Id at 831.
125. Id Judge Gibbons stated that federal standards for preliminary injunctive
relief were clear:
They include the likelihood of the moving party succeeding on the merits at
final hearing, the likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party
pendente lite if no relief is granted, the possibility of harm to other interested
parties from the grant of such relief, and the public interest.
Id (citing Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978); Oburn v.
Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975)).
126. Id at 831. Judge Gibbons referred to earlier portions of the Danziger opinion to satisfy this element: "Since section 93 cannot coexist with section 7 of the
NLRA and section 514 of ERISA, the district court should have recognized that
sooner or later the Union's objection . . .must prevail." d
127. Id. at 831-32. Defining irreparable harm pendente hte as "includ[ing] at
least that kind of harm which cannot be rectified after final hearing by an award of
money damages," the Danzinger court found this element satisfied by the threatened
deprivation of dues revenues under the Commission's order. Id Had the disqualifying order gone into effect, the Union either would have been financially unable to
carry on its collective bargaining responsibilities or it would have been forced to remove the officers. Id at 831. The court ruled that
[i]n neither case would it be possible, long after the event, to measure in
money and compensate for the harm to the ongoing collective bargaining
relationship from intangibles such as erosion of members' confidence in
their chosen collective bargaining organization, delay in the process of
grievances or disruption of internal union affairs.
Id
128. Id The court found that there were ample means available to the state to
maintain casino integrity without need for disqualifying duly certified bargaining
representatives. d
129. Id at 832. The court recognized a "clear national public interest in
preventing erosion of the exclusive role of § 7 in determining collective bargaining
representatives." Id The court found that the public interest in precluding state
interference in matters in "the exclusive preserve of the Board" was evident in two
Supreme Court cases which recognized the Board's option to seek injunctive relief
against state action both before and after the General Counsel has filed a charge. Id.
(citing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Capitol Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954)).
The Danziger court then addressed the Commission's contention that the district
court should have abstained from hearing the case. Id.at 832 (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)). The Third Circuit was
unpersuaded by the Commission's argument under Pullman, noting that Pullman abstention would have required the district court to retain jurisdiction while a narrowing construction of § 93, which might avoid the constitutional adjudication, was
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Judge Gibbons concluded, the district court should have granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of section 93, pending a final hear13
ing on its validity. 1
Judge Becker, writing separately, concurred with that portion of the
majority's opinion which held that the regulation of pension and welfare
fund management under the Casino Control Act was preempted by ERISA.' 3 ' However, he dissented from the panel's holding on NLRA preemption, criticizing the majority for fashioning a "sweeping" preemption
doctrine from federal labor law that "appears to leave no room for state
regulation that affects section 7 rights."' 32 Judge Becker argued that unless
federal regulation expressly precludes state regulation, its preemptive effect
is not absolute.133 Where Congress does not explicitly state an intent to presought from a New Jersey tribunal. Id. at 832. Judge Gibbons explained that the
questions presented by the qualification provisions were "neither technical nor complex" and that the Commission "never suggested any construction of section 93
which could avoid deciding the preemption issue." Id. Thus, the court concluded

that Pullman abstention would have been an "exercise in futility." Id.The court also
rejected the Commission's arguments under Burford, stating that "no argument can
be entertained based on disruption of a state administrative scheme in a case in

which the court is asked to decide whether the very existence of that scheme violates
a paramount federal statute." Id Finally, the court dismissed the Commission's
Younger argument on the grounds that "absent federal district court intervention,"
the "final judgment rule" would permit state agency orders operating as "prior restraints upon the exercise of federally protected rights" to "escape any federal appellate review for long periods." Id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)).
130. Id at 833. The court dismissed the union's overbreadth and vagueness
challenges because resolution of the preemption issues were sufficient to dispose of the
appeal. Id. (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)).
On June 30, 1984, the full Third Circuit denied a request by the Commission
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 35(b) that the case be reheard en banc. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Local 54 v. Danzinger, Nos. 82-5210, 82-5234 and 82-5260 (3d
Cir. June 30, 1983). Circuit Judge Arlin M. Adams filed a written statement explaining his vote to reject the request:
Given the magnitude of a state's interest in regulating an industry such as
the casino industry, and the contention vigorously advanced that such regulation does not inexorably stand as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the Congress in the labor area, whether the [NLRA] preempts a
provision such as section 93 . . .would seem a question worthy of full exploration by the Supreme Court.
Id., slip op. at 3.
131. 709 F.2d at 833 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Becker regarded ERISA's explicit statement of intent as "superseding any and
all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan . . ."as a rare
but unmistakeable indication of intent to usurp a particular field of regulation. Id at

836 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1976)).
132. d at 835 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge

Becker asserted that the preemption doctrine was far from absolute, and that the
importance of the local concern in this instance was critical to a determination of
whether § 93 constituted an impermissible intrustion into federally protected rights.
Id at 835-36 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

133. Id.at 836-37 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker characterized the majority's view that where activity is specifically protected
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empt state regulation, he felt that the appropriate test was that articulated
by the Supreme Court in Local 926 v. Jones.134 Judge Becker contended that
in order for the court properly to determine the implicit preemptive scope of
a federal statute, it "must examine thoroughly the purposes and policies of
the federal scheme and the extent to which state regulation would be
' 135
incompatible."
Judge Becker stated that the first question under theJones analysis was
whether Congress intended section 7 to preempt all attempts by states to
impose criteria on whom employees may select as their bargaining representatives. 136 He criticized the majority's characterization of Hill v. Florida as
controlling on this issue.1 37 Judge Becker asserted that Congress, both by
by § 7, state regulation is absolutely prohibited as "inaccurate" and "oversimplified."
Id He stated that a court should reach a conclusion that an area is absolutely preempted by federal law only where Congress expresses its intent explicitly in the statute or unmistakeably in the legislative history. Id at 836 (Becker, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
134. Id at 837 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 1458-59). According to Judge Becker,Jones maintains that state
laws are ordinarily preempted if they regulate conduct arguably protected by the
NLRA unless the strong local concern justifying the regulation outweighs the harm
to the federal regulatory scheme caused by the state statute. Id (citing 103 S. Ct. at
1458-59). Judge Becker argued that, in light of the fact that § 7, unlike ERISA,
contained no express preemptory provisions, the majority was incorrect in concluding
that there was neither occasion nor justification for engaging in weighing or balancing. Id at 837 n.4 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id.at 837 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
De~eau v. Brazried, 363 U.S. at 153). Since § 7 of the NLRA does not "wear [its]
preemptive nature on its sleeve," Judge Becker considered the weighing and balancing approach taken by theJones Court to be the appropriate standard for determining the preemptive scope of § 7. Id.at 836-37 (Becker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Becker quoted the analysis he felt the Jones Court had
mandated:
First, we determine whether the conduct that the state seeks to regulate or
to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited
by the NLRA . . . . [If so], otherwise applicable state law and procedures
are ordinarily preempted . . . . When, however, the conduct at issue is

only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the state of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or
sanction of the conduct . .

.

. The question of whether regulation should

be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves
a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by
Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in
terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted
cause of action to the state as a protection to its citizens.
Id.at 837 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotingJones, 103 S.
Ct. at 1458-59).
136. Id.
137. Id at 836-37 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker asserted that the majority was incorrect in concluding that Hlv. Florida controlled this case and required the conclusion that § 93 was preempted. Id at 838
(Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Judge Becker,
the purpose of the Florida statute at issue in Hill was to regulate all labor unions in
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enacting the LMRDA and by approving the DeVeau compact, evinced an
intent to allow state-imposed eligibility requirements in certain circumstances.1 3 3 He argued that it was futile to attempt to discern a preemptory
intent from the LMRDA, since it was sprinkled with both savings and preemption provisions. 139 Judge Becker stated that just as it was possible for
the majority to conclude that Congress intended to preempt state law by
failing to include a savings provision in section 504, it was equally plausible
that Congress did not intend to preempt since it also failed to include a preemption provision.1 40 Judge Becker also argued that since one of the factors
motivating Congress to enact the LMRDA was the inability of the states to
control criminal infiltration of labor unions, it would be reasonable to interpret more restrictive state eligibility requirements as "complementing the
federal scheme."141
Similarly, Judge Becker asserted that DeVeau v. Braisted indicated that
the state. Id at 839 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted
that § 93, on the other hand, regulated only those unions representing members
working in the casino industry. Id. Moreover, Judge Becker asserted that § 93 was
part of a state statute, which, unlike Hill, was not labor oriented. Id. Thus, he concluded that "Hill's rejection of Florida's attempt to establish qualifications for all
union officials does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the legislation here at
issue is also inconsistent with congressional intent." Id. (footnote omitted).

Judge Becker also rejected the majority's assertion that Congress' approval of
Hill was manifested by its twice having enacted, with knowledge of Hill, major labor
legislation without overruling it. Id. at 840 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dis-

senting in part). Judge Becker criticized the majority for "rely[ing] too heavily" on
Curran, by failing to recognize that congressional inaction was only evidence of acquiescence, and that Curran'sformulation was adopted in a much simpler context. Id 84041 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)). For a discussion of the
majority's application of Curran, see note 106 and accompanying text supra.
138. 709 F.2d at 843-45 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of the LMRDA, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of DeVeau, see notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra.
139. 709 F.2d at 841-43 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Becker found that while LMRDA sections 603(a) and 604 contain clauses preserving state remedies, section 483 is "expressly preemptive." Id at 841-42 (Becker,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, judge Becker regarded as ill-

reasoned the majority's inference of preemptive intent from the omission of a savings
clause in § 504. Id For the pertinent portion of the majority's reasoning, see notes
108-12 and accompanying text supra.
140. 709 F.2d at 842 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
addition, Judge Becker asserted that the majority had incorrectly concluded that
§ 603(a) of the LMRDA was limited to the preservation of state law remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Judge Becker noted that the Supreme Court in DeVeau
had broadly interpreted § 603(a) as "an express disclaimer of pre-emption of state
laws regulating the responsibilittes of union offacils, except where such preemption is expressly provided .......
Id. at 843 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 157) (emphasis added). For a discussion of DeVeau, see notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the LMRDA,

see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
141. 709 F.2d at 843 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). For a discussion of the LMRDA's legislative history, see notes 25-27
and accompanying text supra.
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Congress did not view all state eligibility requirements as inimical to federal
regulation of labor relations.1 42 Judge Becker noted that the four-Justice
plurality in DeVeau began its preemption analysis by inquiring whether Congress would find that restriction of leadership eligibility in the waterfront
industry frustrated national labor policy.' 43 He reasoned that since the DeVeau plurality thought such an inquiry was necessary, the four Justices had
rejected any inference that Congress intended an automatic "blanket" preemption of all state legislation relating to employee choice of bargaining representatives. 14 4 To the contrary, Judge Becker found that DeVeau
exemplified Congress' approval of state eligibility requirements which were
justified by strong local concerns.' 4 5 He noted that "Congress apparently
perceived the problem of labor corruption on the waterfront to be of sufficient severity that state regulation would not be inimical to federal labor
1 46

policy."'

142. 709 F.2d at 843-46 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 144). For a discussion of DeVeau, see notes 67-73 and
accompanying text supra.
143. 709 F.2d at 844 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Becker invoked the DeVeau plurality's characterization of the issue as
whether we may fairly infer a congressional purpose incompatible with the
. . .restrictions upon the choice of a bargaining representative embodied in
§ 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act. Would Congress, with a
lively regard for its own federal labor policy, find in this state enactment a
true, real frustration . . .of that policy?
Id. (quoting DeVeau, 373 U.S. at 153). While he recognized that congressional approval of the Waterfront Commission Compact facilitated the Court's decision in
DeVeau, Judge Becker felt that the DeVeau plurality's "formulation strongly implies
that a court without access to similarly conclusive extrinsic evidence nevertheless
should attempt to determine whether Congress would have intended to preclude the
particular state legislation at issue." Id. at 844 (Becker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
144. Id. Moreover, Judge Becker asserted that DeVeau is important for "the insight it provides courts trying to 'imaginatively summon the likely reaction of Congress'" to state laws establishing requirements for union officials. Id. (quoting
DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 153).
145. Id at 844-45 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker quoted the report of the House Judiciary Committee which expressly noted
that " 't]he compact to which the committee here recommends that Congress grant
its consent is in no sense antilabor legislation, but rather, antiracketeering legislation.' " Id. at 845 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 998, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953)). Judge Becker pointed out that
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in DeVeau distinguished Hill on the grounds that Hill
involved a broad regulation of labor, while DeVeau dealt with a crime prevention
program. 709 F.2d at 844 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 155) (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Justice
Frankfurter had written, "It is instructive that this unique provision has occurred in
connection with approval of a compact dealing with the prevention of crine where,
because of the pecul'arly local nature of the problem, the inference is strongest that local polci~es
are not to be thwarted." Id (quoting DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J.)) (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 845 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker explained:
I do not suggest that DeVeau compels the conclusion that the NLRA does
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Having concluded that Congress did not intend section 7 to preempt all
state laws establishing eligibility requirements for bargaining representatives, Judge Becker undertook the second inquiry underjones: whether section 93 was intended to address the type of deeply-rooted local concern
which justified state regulation of section 7 activity. 147 Judge Becker concluded that the legitimacy of New Jersey's interest in controlling crime in the
casino industry was "beyond dispute,"' 48 and so deeply rooted as to justify
49
any resulting intrusion upon section 7 rights.'
not preempt section 93 of the Casino Control Act; certainly the absence of a
majority opinion there, and of a congressionally approved compact here,
would undercut any such argument. At the same time, DeVeau cannot be
written off solely because it involved a compact, especially since the most
plausible interpretation of its underlying scenario is that Congress did not
view all state regulation of the qualifications of union officials as incompatible with the overall federal regulatory scheme. The fact that the LMRDA
does not preclude the states from enacting more stringent criteria than are
embodied in section 504 supports that conclusion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
147. Id. at 846-49 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
discussion ofJones, see notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
148. 709 F.2d at 846-49 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Judge Becker cited numerous reports and studies which established a clear connection between organized crime and gambling. Id Judge Becker quoted one commentator who explained that gambling was attractive to organized crime for two reasons:
First, a casino contains a vast amount of liquid assets in the form of cash
and gaming chips which are very attractive and susceptible to misappropriation. Second, these liquid assets remain uncounted and unrecorded as the
gaming activity takes place. Casinos are unique because millions of dollars
are continually changing hands among thousands of people on the casino
floor without any record being made of how much money is exchanged,
how many people are involved, or who those individuals are.
Id at 846 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Santaniello,
Casino Gambhg." The Elements of Effectioe Control, 6 SETON HAL. LEGIS. J. 23, 23
(1982) (footnote omitted)). Several reports commissioned by the state concluded that
"only the most stringent of gambling control laws can thwart the infiltration of casinos and related services and suppliers by organized crime." Id at 847 (Becker, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting STATE COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATION ON CASINO GAMBLING II (1977)). It was
with this knowledge, Judge Becker stated, that the New Jersey legislature enacted the
Casino Control Act. Id at 848 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The legislature sought to prevent "criminal elements from gaining a foothold in the
industry" by creating the Casino Control Commission and the Division of Gaming
Enforcement to "insure the integrity of the casino industry." Id at 848-49 (Becker,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Becker explained as follows:
"Given the unique nature of the industry-in particular its tremendous, unmonitored cash flow and its consequent attractiveness to organized crime-the concerns of the legislature and citizenry cannot be characterized as anything less than
'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' " Id at 849 (Becker, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quotingjones, 103 S. Ct. at 1459).
149. Id. at 849-51 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker reasoned as follows:
[C]ongress' acquiescence in the legislation at issue in DeVeau suggests a congressional perception that, in situations where the threat to the welfare to
the state is so persuasive and so well-documented that the need for comprehensive state regulation is manifest, such regulation will be permissible even
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In reviewing the Third Circuit's decision in Danziger, it is submitted
that the majority employed conclusory reasoning inconsistent with Supreme
Court preemption analysis 150 to hold that New Jersey was precluded from
regulating its casino gambling industry in any manner which affected employee rights under section 7 of the NLRA.151 In assuming that employees'
freedom to choose bargaining representatives is absolutely protected, it is
submitted that the majority misconstrued congressional intent and disregarded Supreme Court precedent which mandates weighing of interests. 152
Congress had recognized that section 7's protection of employee free
choice is not absolute. In enacting the LMRDA, Congress recognized the
need to control labor corruption through certain limited restrictions on employee choice in union leadership. 153 Moreover, Congress has specifically
considered and rejecled the argument that imposing qualifications for union
office is per se inconsistent with section 7.154 By authorizing New York to
enact whatever implementing legislation it deemed necessary to deal with
Congress gave a clear signal
criminal infiltration of the waterfront industry, 55
protection.'
absolute
an
not
was
7
that section
if it includes a component that directly restricts section 7 rights. I believe
such situations to be rare, but I believe that one is presented here.
Id.at 849-50 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). Judge Becker explained further that the Casino Control Act was limited solely
to casino employees and that the officials were not prevented from holding office in
other locals within the same union. Id. Moreover, he concluded that New Jersey's
legislation was not a display of anti-union animus, but was rather a "conscientious
and well-reasoned attempt to erect a breakwater against a tide of vice and corruption
that could engulf Atlantic City's casinos." Id at 851 (Becker, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
150. For a discussion of Supreme Court preemption analysis, see notes 32-44
and accompanying text supra.
151. See 709 F.2d at 828.
152. See Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 1458-59; DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 152. The Court in
DeVeau explained, "The doctrine of preemption does not present a problem in physics but one of adjustment because of the interdependence of federal and state interests and of the interaction of federal and state powers." 363 U.S. at 152.
153. See 709 F.2d at 841 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Becker noted that by enacting the LMRDA, "Congress . . .has established
that the choice is no longer unfettered and that national labor policy admits of some
such limitations." Id.The DeVeau Court explained that by imposing its own qualification provisions, Congress has given evidence that itdoes not view similar state
restrictions as "incompatible with its labor policies." 363 U.S. at 156. The DeVeau
Court also recognized that consistent with congressional approval of restrictions on
employee free choice, Congress has not immunized union officials from operation of
state criminal or fiduciary obligation laws and has permitted removal of officers who
have breached these state-imposed responsibilities. Id at 57.
154. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 150-52. The Waterfront compact implicated in
DeVeau was approved by Congress despite objections by organized labor that stateimposed eligibility requirements interfered with employees' § 7 rights. Id
155. See id at 150-52. The Court noted that Congress was aware of union contentions that state-imposed restrictions would interfere with employee § 7 rights, but
rejected the argument on the basis that such restrictions were required to control
crime, corruption, and racketeering on the waterfront of the port of New York. Id.
Judge Becker explained that "Congress apparently perceived the problem of labor
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The Supreme Court's analysis of federal labor policy and the extent to
which state regulation interfered with that policy in DeVeau v. Braisled indicated that section 7 was not intended to have an automatic or absolute preemptive effect. 156 Rather, the Court has required a balancing of state and
federal interests 157 and, for provisions designed to control crime, the "infer1 58
ence is strongest that local policies are not to be thwarted."
It is further submitted that New Jersey's interest in maintaining the
integrity of casino operations is a significant local concern. Although the
Danziger majority characterized organized crime as a national problem, 159
the Supreme Court has identified this state interest as "peculiarly local" and
a justification for state intervention.160 Judge Becker cited numerous reports
detailing the susceptibility of gambling to infiltration and control by organcorruption on the waterfront to be of sufficient severity that state regulation would
not be inimical to federal labor policy." Id. at 845 (Becker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
156. 363 U.S. at 152-53. The Court stated that its task was to determine
whether Congress would find in the state law a frustration of national labor policy,
and that in the case subJudice Congress' consent to the compact only made their job
easier. Id. at 153. The Court explained that the mere presence of state restrictions on
employee free choice "does not settle the issue of preemption" and that the NLRA
"does not exclude every state policy that may restrict employee free choice." id at

152. Judge Becker explained that the DeVeau Court "expressly recognized the importance of considering the particular situation and regulation at issue, rather than
adopting a blanket approach to the preemption question." 709 F.2d at 844 (Becker,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions requiring weighing of interests, see note 60 and accompanying text supra. As recently as 1983, the Court has
reaffirmed the position that a balancing of state and federal interests on a case-bycase basis is necessary where state laws implicate § 7 protections. See Jones, 103 S. Ct.
at 1458-59.
158. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 154. The Court has stated that "the history of the

labor pre-emption doctrine in this Court does not support an approach which sweeps
away state-court jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation
without careful consideration of the relevant impact of such a jurisdictional bar on
the various interests affected." Sears, 436 U.S. at 180. It should be noted that the
Supreme Court decision in San Diego Buddthg Trades Counci v. Garmon, which the Danziger majority cited in support of its conclusion that the total protection afforded
employee free choice makes consideration of the local interest unnecessary, is the case

most often credited with developing the "deeply rooted" local interest exception to
federal labor law preemption. See Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 1458-59 (citing (armon, 359
U.S. at 236). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 779. For a discussion of Garmon,
see notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
159. 709 F.2d at 832. The Danziger court quickly dismissed the local-concern
argument by asserting that other industries, such as the solid waste industry, were
also susceptible to infiltration by organized crime. Id at 830 & n.10. The court

contended that the problem of organized crime is one of national concern that has
been addressed by Congress in both federal criminal statutes and by provisions permitting state criminal laws to operate against union leaders. Id. at 830. Allowing
states more leeway would, according to the majority, "Balkanize the law with respect
to choice of collective bargaining representatives in non-exempt interstate commerce.
Id
160. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 144. The DeVeau Court explained that crime control is a significant local interest and that "because of the peculiarly local nature of
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ized crime.16 1 Moreover, criminal control of labor unions serving the casino
industry is of particular concern to state governments given the opportunities of labor organization officials to manipulate large sums of money and
exert self-serving pressure on casino owners with threats of labor strife. 162
It is also submitted that the Third Circuit majority avoided interestbalancing by an unwarranted extension of Hill v. Florida.163 It is submitted
the problem, the inference is strongest that local policies are not to be thwarted." Id
at 154.
161. For a discussion of these reports, see notes 148-49 and accompanying text
supra. See also Philadelphia Inquirer, October 12, 1983, § A3, cols. 2-5 (recent indictment of 15 individuals, including several reputed bosses of organized crime, charged
with "skimming" nearly $2 million in profits from Las Vegas casinos).
162. 709 F.2d at 846-49 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The potential dangers of criminal control over labor unions are grave. One journalist
has expressed fears that
[i]f the state of New Jersey is to have no say whatever in who shall represent
casino employees in contract negotiations and other union matters, even to
the extent of being unable to bar union officials on grounds of ties with
organized crime, then the entire casino business in Atlantic City might just
as well be turned over to the mob without further argument.
The mob would be in full control. That control would extend beyond the
gambling halls to government and business in Atlantic City-and would
contaminate political and economic apparatus throughout the state.
Philadelphia Inquirer, July 11, 1983, at A10, col. 1. It appears that fear of criminal
infiltration into labor unions is well founded. See Philadelphia Inquirer, April 15,
1984, at Al, cols. 1-2 (allegation that several Local 54 officials including President
Gerace funnelled campaign contributions from organized crime members to former
Atlantic City Mayor Michael Mathews); id., Sept. 21, 1983, at B4, cols. 1-6 (Senate
investigating subcommittee presented evidence that nearly one third of the $1.5 million paid by employees into Local 54's dental plan had been diverted to "a reputed
associate of Philadelphia organized crime figures"); Id, April 7, 1983, at B6, col. 1
(indictment of Frank Gerace, President of Local 54, and two construction company
officials charged with embezzling $31,000 in union funds by inflating renovation
costs at union buildings).
163. See 709 F.2d at 823-28. The Danziger majority characterized Hll as controlling on the preclusive effect of § 7 "unless modified by subsequent federal legislation or overruled by the Supreme Court." Id. at 825. The court construed
congressional silence after Hill as a ratification of its holding and an accurate indication of congressional intent. Id at 825-28. For a discussion of Hll, see notes 62-66
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning, see notes
100-07 and accompanying text supra. Judge Becker explained, however, that "congressional inaction is only evidence of congressional acquiescence; neither in Curran
nor elsewhere has the Supreme Court said that such inaction resolves the question of
congressional intent." 709 F.2d at 840 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
382-88 (1982)). In addition, the Danziger majority found it persuasive that Congress
did not attach a savings provision to section 504 of the LMRDA when it had done so
for other provisions. Id at 827-28. However, Congress also failed to include a preemption provision as it had done for other sections of the Act. Id at 842 (Becker, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). From this, Judge Becker concluded that it
was possible to "draw an inference at least as strong as the majority's, that Congress
intended to preempt only when it did so explicitly." Id. Moreover, Judge Becker
reasoned that, in reality, the erratic allocation of savings and preemption provisions
in the LMRDA made "futile any attempt to divine congressional intent from the
absence of a savings clause in section 504." Id.
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that the court should have acknowledged that Hll involved a state's attempt
to impose a sweeping general regulation of labor relations, unjustified by any
peculiar state concern. 164
In addition, the majority improperly limited DeVeau to its unique procedural facts.165 It is suggested that DeVeau bears a strong factual resemblance
to the regulation under consideration and would be a better basis for discussion in this case. First, both the New York regulation in DeVeau and the New
Jersey regulation presented in Danziger were narrowly tailored to affect a
specific local industry as opposed to the general regulation implicated in
HI'z/. 166 Further, New York and New Jersey were motivated by the same
perceived need for intervention in their target industries because of their
peculiar susceptibility to organized crime, 167 a concern which the Supreme
168
Court has regarded as "peculiarly local."'
Finally, it is submitted that Judge Becker properly distinguished the
express preemptive language of ERISA from the general protections of section 7,169 deeming the latter to require interest balancing.' 70 Had the ma164. See id. at 839 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Becker asserted that the difference in scope of the two statutes necessitated different

treatment:
The central distinction between Hil and that case concerns the challenged
laws themselves. The Florida statute at issue in Hil did nothing but establish qualification for the officials of all labor unions in the state. Apparently, the state's sole purpose was the regulation of labor unions in the state.
Section 93 of the Casino Control Act, by contrast, does not seek to regulate
all unions, but only those members working in the casino industry. Moreover, section 93 is part of a larger regulatory scheme whose purpose is by no
means labor-oriented. Thus Hill's rejection of Florida's attempt to establish
qualifications for all union officials does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the legislation here at issue also is inconsistent with congressional
intent.

Id (footnote omitted) (emphasis in the original).
165. See id. at 828. The court found it significant that Justice Frankfurter responded to arguments by a union official that the compact interfered with § 7 by
stating that Congress' intent was clear given its specific approval of the compact. Id.
(citingDeVeau, 363 U.S. at 153). Judge Becker noted, "DeVeau cannot be written off
solely because it involved a compact, especially since the most plausible interpretation of its underlying scenario is that Congress did not view all state regulation of the
qualifications of union officials as incompatible with the overall federal regulatory
scheme." I. at 845 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. For a discussion of the facts of DeVeau, see notes 67-70 and accompanying
text supra. For the text of § 93, see note 91 and accompanying test supra.

167. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 147-50 (purpose of compact was to control crime
and corruption on the waterfront of the port of New York). See N.J. STATr. ANN.
§ 5:12-1 (b) (6) (West Supp. 1983) (purpose of Casino Control Act is to maintain public confidence and trust in the credibility and integrity of the regulatory process and
of casino operations).
168. For a discussion of the Court's characterization, see notes 160 and accompanying text supra.
169. See 708 F.2d at 836-37 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Unlike ERISA, § 7 contains no explicit statements regarding its preemptive
scope. For the text of ERISA's preemption provision, see note 75 and accompanying
text supra. Judge Becker explained that § 7 does not wear its "preemptive nature on
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jority conducted the weighing of interests mandated by Jones and DeVeau, it
is suggested that it would have concluded, as Judge Becker did, that section
93 of the Casino Control Act is not inconsistent with federal protection of
employee rights. 171
The most dramatic potential impact of Danzzger is that its invalidation
of minimal state control over the qualifications of union officials may expose
72
Moreover, by emcasino operations to infiltration by organized crime.1
the Third
interest,
local
the
ignores
which
analysis
preemption
a
ploying
Circuit has adopted a position which has not generally been espoused by the
Supreme Court. 17 3 Since this precedent may influence lower courts to invalidate state laws without giving adequate consideration to the legitimate local
concerns which prompted their enactment, it is urged that the Supreme
Court reverse the NLRA aspect of the Third Circuit's decision, and set forth
a clear standard to aid lower courts confronted with NLRA preemption
questions.
Andrew Bramnzck
its sleeve" and it would be a mistake to infer from that silence that either all conflicting state regulation is permissible or that all state regulation is preempted. Id.
170. Id.at 835 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Danzzger, Nos. 82-5210, 82-5234 and 92-5260, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. June 30, 1983)
(order denying rehearing en banc). Judge Arlin Adams in a statement giving his reasons for rejecting an en banc rehearing explained that "[t]his appeal presents an extremely important issue concerning the proper balance of state and federal authority
over labor unions in the casino industry, an industry which by its very nature must be
regulated carefully and perhaps extensively by state governments." Id.(Adams, J.,
statement sur petition for rehearing). For a discussion of the weighing of interests
approach, see notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
171. See 709 F.2d at 849-51 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
172. See id.at 846-49 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the dangers of criminal infiltration into casino operations).
173. For a discussion of Supreme Court preemption analysis, see notes 45-60
and accompanying text supra.
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